Public Opinion Poll # 25

Post-Election Survey

Priorities and Expectations

Negotiations and the Peace Process

The New Government

Living Conditions

Evaluation of Public Opinion Polls

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Field Work: 27-29/3/2006

Sample size: 1200 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

Number of sampling localities: 75

Margin of error: ± 3%

- * For further information or queries, contact team coordinator Dr. Nader Said or Polling coordinator Ayman Abdul Majeed at the listed address or through our website.
- * Many thanks go to our field researchers, and the International Republican Institute (IRI) for their support.

Contact Info:

Ramallah Office:

Irsal Str. opposite Khalid Hospital

Tel: 970 (2) 2959250 970 (2) 2958116

Fax: 970(2) 2958117

P.O. Box 1878

Ramallah, Palestine

Gaza Office:

Sa'ad Ibn Al-'As Str. Ni'mah Commercial Center, 1st fl., office no. 104 Telefax: 970 (8) 2838884

Gaza, Palestine

E-mail: dsp@birzeit.edu

Annex 1
Results of Opinion Poll # 25

| Results of Opinion Fon # 25 | | | | |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--|
| First Section: Post-Elections | | | | |
| | Total % | West Bank % | Gaza Strip % | |
| 1. Were you registered | to vote in the la | test PLC election | ns (25-1-2006)? | |
| 1) Yes | 81 | 78 | 85 | |
| 2) No | 19 | 22 | 15 | |
| If yes, did you vote in | the latest PLC | elections (25-1-20 | 006)? | |
| 1) Yes | 87 | 83 | 94 | |
| 2) No | 13 | 17 | 6 | |
| 1. If PLC elections to would you vote for? | ook place today, | which one of th | e following lists | |
| 1) Change and Reform | 50 | 48 | 52 | |
| 2) Fateh Movement | 35 | 33 | 38 | |
| 3) Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa | 3 | 3 | 3 | |
| 4) The Alternative | 2 | 4 | 0.0 | |
| 5) Independent Palestine | 1 | 2 | 0.0 | |
| 6) The Third Way | 1 | 1 | 0.7 | |
| 7) Martyr Abu Al- Abbas | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | |
| 8) The Palestinian Justice | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | |
| 9) Freedom and social Justice | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | |
| 10) Others | 8 | 9 | 7 | |
| 2. Which Political gr | oup do you supp | port? | | |
| 1) Hamas | 40 | 40 | 40 | |
| 2) Fateh | 30 | 27 | 35 | |
| 3) Islamic Jihad | 3 | 3 | 2 | |
| 4) PFLP | 3 | 3 | 3 | |

| 5) DFLP | 1 | 1 | 0.5 |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|---------|
| 6) PPP | 1 | 0.5 | 1.0 |
| 7) Independent Palestine | 1 | 1 | 0.5 |
| 8) The Third way | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| 9) Fida | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0 |
| 10) Others / Independent | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| 11) No one | 14 | 17 | 11 |
| 3. On a district level, | you mostly vot | ed for candidates | s from? |
| 1) Change and Reform | 39 | 37 | 41 |
| 2) Fateh Movement | 31 | 27 | 36 |
| 3) Other lists / Independents | 30 | 36 | 24 |

| | Total % | West Bank % | Gaza Strip % |
|---------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 4. (For those who didn | 't vote): What | was the main | factor that led |
| you to not participate? | | | |
| 1) I wanted to | 21 | 24 | 6 |
| participate, but was busy | | | |
| 2) PLC elections are | 20 | 22 | 10 |
| irrelevant (lead to | | | |
| no change) | | | |
| 3) Not convinced with | 13 | 13 | 13 |
| candidates/lists | | | |
| 4) I couldn't find my | 6 | 5 | 10 |
| voting center / or | | | |
| my name wasn't on | | | |
| the lists | | | |
| 5) I didn't have | 3 | 4 | 0.0 |
| enough information | | | |
| on the | | | |
| elections/candidate | | | |
| S | | | |
| 6) My political group | 1 | 2 | 0.0 |
| called for a boycott | | | |
| 7) Worried about | 1 | 1 | 0.0 |
| being deprived of | | | |
| my privileges as a | | | |
| Jerusalem resident | | | |

| 8) The measures of the | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
|--|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| occupation | 35 | 29 | 61 |
| 9) Others5. In general, do you fee | | | |
| g , , | | | |
| 1) Yes | 59 | 60 | 59 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 18 | 20 | 14 |
| 3) No | 23 | 21 | 28 |
| 6. Did you expect Hama | | | |
| 1) Yes | 36 | 40 | 32 |
| 2) No | 62 | 57 | 67 |
| 3) Don't know | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| 7. How do you evaluate | the performan | nce of the previo | us PLC? |
| 1) Good | 17 | 18 | 15 |
| 2) Fair | 32 | 34 | 28 |
| 3) Weak | 45 | 41 | 52 |
| 4) Don't Know | 6 | 7 | 5 |
| 8. Were the PLC election | ons free and fai | r? | |
| 1) Fair | 78 | 75 | 84 |
| 2) Somewhat fair | 12 | 13 | 9 |
| 3) Unfair | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| 4) Don't know | 5 | 7 | 3 |
| Second Section: Priori | ties and Exp | pectations | |
| 9. Do you consider t | | to be priorities | for the new |
| | | | |
| government (led by Ismael | | | |
| Reducing unemployment ra | ates | QQ | 01 |
| Reducing unemployment ra | 90 | 88 | 91 |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent | 90 6 | 7 | 5 |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No | 90 6 4 | | |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional con | 90 6 4 | 7 5 | 5 4 |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional cor 1) Yes | 90 6 4 cruption 89 | 7 5 87 | 5 4 92 |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional cor 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent | 90 6 4 cruption 89 | 7 5 87 7 | 5 4 92 5 |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional cor 1) Yes | 90 6 4 cruption 89 7 4 | 7 5 87 7 5 | 5 4 92 5 3 |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional cor 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent | 90 6 4 cruption 89 | 7 5 87 7 5 West Bank | 5 4 92 5 3 Gaza Strip |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional cor 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent | 90 6 4 cruption 89 7 4 Total % | 7 5 87 7 5 | 5 4 92 5 3 |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional cor 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No | 90 6 4 cruption 89 7 4 Total % | 7 5 87 7 5 West Bank | 5 4 92 5 3 Gaza Strip |
| 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Uprooting institutional cor 1) Yes 2) Yes to some extent 3) No Achieving economic develor | 90 6 4 cruption 89 7 4 Total % | 7 5 87 7 5 West Bank | 5 4 92 5 3 Gaza Strip |

| 1) Yes | 87 | 85 | 90 |
|------------------------------|-----------------|--------|----|
| 2) Yes to some extent | 9 | 10 | 7 |
| 3) No | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| Solving social problems | | | |
| 1) Yes | 86 | 83 | 90 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 10 | 11 | 8 |
| 3) No | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| Ending security chaos | | | |
| 1) Yes | 89 | 87 | 92 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 7 | 8 | 5 |
| 3) No | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| Ending the occupation | | | |
| 1) Yes | 85 | 84 | 87 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 8 | 9 | 6 |
| 3) No | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Halting the building of sett | lements and the | e Wall | |
| 1) Yes | 84 | 84 | 83 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| 3) No | 8 | 8 | 9 |
| Promoting democracy | | | |
| 1) Yes | 82 | 78 | 88 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 10 | 12 | 8 |
| 3) No | 7 | 10 | 4 |
| Consolidating public and p | ersonal freedon | ns | |
| 1) Yes | 82 | 80 | 87 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 9 | 10 | 8 |
| 3) No | 9 | 10 | 5 |
| Obtaining international fur | nding | | |
| 1) Yes | 82 | 81 | 85 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 9 | 8 | 10 |
| 3) No | 8 | 11 | 5 |
| Promoting diplomatic relat | tions | | |
| 1) Yes | 80 | 79 | 84 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 12 | 12 | 10 |
| 3) No | 8 | 9 | 6 |

| | Total % | West Bank | Gaza Strip |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------|
| Promoting the status of w | omen | 0/0 | 0/0 |
| 1) Yes | 79 | 78 | 80 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 14 | 14 | 14 |
| 3) No | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| 10. Do you expect that the following? | the new govern | nment will succe | |
| Promoting government se | rvices | | |
| 1) Yes | 61 | 57 | 67 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 25 | 28 | 21 |
| 3) No | 14 | 15 | 12 |
| Uprooting institutional co | orruption | | |
| 1) Yes | 60 | 54 | 70 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 25 | 29 | 18 |
| 3) No | 15 | 17 | 12 |
| Solving social problems | | | |
| 1) Yes | 57 | 52 | 64 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 29 | 31 | 25 |
| 3) No | 14 | 17 | 11 |
| Ending security chaos | | | |
| 1) Yes | 54 | 51 | 59 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 26 | 27 | 24 |
| 3) No | 20 | 22 | 17 |
| Consolidating public and | personal freedo | oms | |
| 1) Yes | 55 | 52 | 59 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 24 | 26 | 22 |
| 3) No | 21 | 22 | 19 |
| Promoting democracy | | | |
| 1) Yes | 54 | 50 | 60 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 26 | 28 | 23 |
| 3) No | 20 | 22 | 18 |
| Promoting the status of w | omen | | |
| 1) Yes | 51 | 48 | 56 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 29 | 31 | 26 |
| 3) No | 20 | 21 | 18 |
| · | | | |

| Promoting diplomatic rela | ations | | |
|---|----------------|-----------|------------|
| 1) Yes | 48 | 44 | 53 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 29 | 32 | 24 |
| 3) No | 23 | 24 | 23 |
| Achieving economic develo | opment | • | • |
| 1) Yes | 47 | 43 | 55 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 33 | 37 | 27 |
| 3) No | 19 | 20 | 18 |
| | Total % | West Bank | Gaza Strip |
| Reducing unemployment | rates | | |
| 1) Yes | 46 | 42 | 54 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 34 | 38 | 28 |
| 3) No | 19 | 21 | 18 |
| Obtaining international fu | ınding | | |
| 1) Yes | 45 | 41 | 52 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 28 | 30 | 25 |
| 3) No | 27 | 29 | 23 |
| Ending the occupation | | • | • |
| 1) Yes | 26 | 24 | 31 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 30 | 28 | 33 |
| 3) No | 44 | 48 | 36 |
| Halting the building of set | tlements and w | vall | - |
| 1) Yes | 25 | 21 | 33 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 27 | 27 | 28 |
| 3) No | 48 | 52 | 39 |
| 11. In general, do yo enhancing Palestinian cha | | | |
| 1) Yes | 48 | 46 | 51 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 27 | 28 | 26 |
| 3) No | 21 | 21 | 21 |
| 4) Don't know | 4 | 5 | 2 |
| 12. In general, do yo enhancing Palestinian cha | | | |
| 1) Yes | 56 | 51 | 64 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 25 | 28 | 21 |
| 3) No | 15 | 17 | 12 |
| 4) Don't know | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| | | | |

| 13. In general, do yo enhancing Palestinian cha | | | n will lead to | | |
|--|---|----------|----------------|--|--|
| 1) Yes | 50 | 45 | 57 | | |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 26 | 27 | 23 | | |
| 3) No | 19 | 21 | 17 | | |
| 4) Don't know | 6 | 7 | 3 | | |
| Third Section: Politic | Third Section: Political Issues and the Peace Process | | | | |
| 14. Do you support or oppose that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people? | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| 1) Support | 63 | 61 | 67 | | |
| 1) Support 2) Oppose | 63 29 | 61 30 | 67 28 | | |

| | Total % | West Bank | Gaza Strip | | |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|--|--|
| | | % | % | | |
| 15. Do you support or oppose that Hamas should recognize that the | | | | | |
| PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian? | | | | | |
| 1) Support | 70 | 67 | 74 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 22 | 23 | 21 | | |
| 3) No opinion | 8 | 10 | 5 | | |
| 16. Do you think the | | 0 | he Basic Law | | |
| (constitution) that was ap | proved by the P | PLC in 2002? | | | |
| 1) Support | 55 | 55 | 53 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 33 | 31 | 36 | | |
| 3) No opinion | 13 | 14 | 11 | | |
| 17. Do you believe that | the primary de | ecision maker sh | ould be? | | |
| 1) The PLO | 39 | 35 | 44 | | |
| 2) The PNA | 50 | 52 | 47 | | |
| 3) Don't know | 11 | 13 | 8 | | |
| 18. Do you think that | Hamas should | d recognize the | Declaration of | | |
| Independence that was a 1988? | pproved by the | Palestine Natio | onal Council in | | |
| 1) Support | 61 | 61 | 61 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 24 | 24 | 24 | | |
| 3) No opinion | 16 | 15 | 16 | | |
| 19. Do you think that | | | | | |
| conference to negotiate th | e future of the l | Palestinian-Israe | eli conflict? | | |
| 1) Support | 89 | 88 | 92 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 7 | 8 | 6 | | |

| 3) No opinion | 3 | 4 | 2 | | | |
|--|------------|-----------------|-----------------|--|--|--|
| 20. Do you think that Hamas should recognize the international agreements and resolutions regarding Palestine? | | | | | | |
| 1) Support | 70 | 68 | 73 | | | |
| 2) Oppose | 23 | 23 | 22 | | | |
| 3) No opinion | 8 | 9 | 5 | | | |
| 21. Do you think the signed by the PLO and Iss | | ald recognize t | he agreements | | | |
| 1) Support | 48 | 48 | 49 | | | |
| 2) Oppose | 43 | 41 | 46 | | | |
| 3) No opinion | 9 | 12 | 6 | | | |
| 22. Do you think that into negotiations with Isra | | new governmen | t, should enter | | | |
| 1) Support | 78 | 79 | 76 | | | |
| 2) Oppose | 19 | 18 | 20 | | | |
| 3) No opinion | 4 | 3 | 4 | | | |
| 23. Do you support international resolutions? | J. S. F.F. | | | | | |
| 1) Support | 58 | 60 | 55 | | | |
| 2) Oppose | 39 | 36 | 43 | | | |
| 3) No opinion | 3 | 4 | 2 | | | |

| | Total % | West Bank | Gaza Strip % | | |
|--|-------------|-----------|-----------------|--|--|
| 24. Do you think that Hamas should recognize the state of Israel (at the present time)? | | | | | |
| 1) Support | 30 | 28 | 33 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 64 | 65 | 63 | | |
| 3) No opinion | 6 | 7 | 4 | | |
| 25. Do you support or in Israeli cities? | | | | | |
| 1) Support | 35 | 34 | 37 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 59 | 58 | 60 | | |
| 3) No opinion | 6 | 8 | 3 | | |
| Fourth Section: The | New Governi | ment | | | |
| 26. Do you believe the Hamas is serious about enabling other factions to participate in decision making? | | | | | |
| 1) Yes | 64 | 64 | 63 | | |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 17 | 16 | 19 | | |

| 3) No | 14 | 12 | 16 |
|--|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| 4) Don't know | 6 | 8 | 2 |
| 27. Do you think the competent for the job? | at the ministe | ers appointed b | y Hamas ai |
| 1) Yes | 48 | 48 | 49 |
| 2) Yes to some extent | 26 | 26 | 26 |
| 3) No | 13 | 11 | 17 |
| 4) Don't know | 13 | 15 | 9 |
| 28. So far, what is yo Minister Ismael Haneyyeh | ? | | |
| 1) Good | 64 | 57 | 75 |
| 2) Fair | 19 | 22 | 15 |
| 3) Weak | 6 | 7 | 5 |
| 4) I don't know | 11 | 15 | 5 |
| 29. What is your ev Mahmoud Abbas? | aluation of tl | ne performance | e of Preside |
| 1) Good | 54 | 50 | 61 |
| 2) Fair | 27 | 29 | 24 |
| 3) Weak | 15 | 16 | 13 |
| 4) I don't know | 4 | 5 | 2 |
| Fifth Section: Democr | ratic Values | | |
| 30. Do you support a citizens regardless of religi | | | rights for a |
| 1) Support | 87 | 88 | 85 |
| 2) Oppose | 11 | 10 | 13 |
| 3) No opinion | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 31. Do you support a citizens regardless of gend | er? | based on equal | |
| 1) Support | 82 | 84 | 79 |
| 2) Oppose | 16 | 14 | 19 |
| 3) No opinion | 2 | 2 | 2 |

| | Total % | West Bank | Gaza Strip | | |
|--|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|--|--|
| 32. Do you support or oppose freedom of expression and speech? | | | | | |
| 1) Support | 97 | 96 | 99 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 2 | 3 | 1 | | |
| 3) No opinion | 1 | 2 | 0.3 | | |
| 33. Do you support opp | pose regular an | d plural election | s? | | |
| 1) Support | 93 | 92 | 96 | | |
| 2) Oppose | 4 | 5 | 3 | | |
| 3) No opinion | 2 | 3 | 1 | | |
| Sixth Section: Living | Conditions | | | | |
| 34. How do you evalua | te the economic | conditions of yo | our family? | | |
| 1) Very good | 3 | 4 | 2 | | |
| 2) Good | 19 | 21 | 15 | | |
| 3) Fair | 40 | 41 | 37 | | |
| 4) Bad | 23 | 21 | 25 | | |
| 5) Very Bad | 17 | 13 | 22 | | |
| 35. In General, how Palestinians? | do you evaluat | te the overall si | ituation of the | | |
| 1) Very good | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | | |
| 2) Good | 6 | 7 | 3 | | |
| 3) Fair | 27 | 30 | 22 | | |
| 4) Bad | 44 | 43 | 46 | | |
| 5) Very Bad | 23 | 19 | 29 | | |
| 36. Given the opportur | nity, would you | immigrate? | | | |
| 1) Yes | 18 | 17 | 18 | | |
| 2) No | 82 | 82 | 81 | | |
| 3) Don't Know | 1 | 1 | 1 | | |
| Seventh Section: Evaluation of Public Opinion Polls | | | | | |
| 37. Overall, how do you evaluate the Palestinian experience in public opinion polling? | | | | | |
| 1) Good | 58 | 56 | 61 | | |
| 2) Good to some | 27 | 28 | 24 | | |
| extant | | | | | |
| 3) Not good | 9 | 9 | 10 | | |
| 4) Don't Know | 7 | 8 | 5 | | |

| 38. Overall, do you trust the opinion polls carried out in the West Bank and Gaza? | | | | |
|--|----|----|----|--|
| 1) Yes, I trust | 48 | 47 | 50 | |
| 2) Trust to some | 30 | 32 | 27 | |
| extant | | | | |
| 3) I don't Trust | 15 | 14 | 17 | |
| 4) Don't Know | 7 | 7 | 6 | |

Annex 2

Cross tabulations

Table (1):

Expectations for the new Government

(% of those who don't expect the new Government to be able to achieve the following)

| ccupation | Uprooting corruption | Reducing Unemployment | Ending Chaos | Promoting Democracy |
|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|
| 1% | 17% | 22% | 20% | 22% |
| 5% | 12% | 18% | 18% | 18% |
| 8% | 16% | 20% | 21% | 22% |
| 0% | 10% | 19% | 24% | 26% |
| 7% | 17% | 22% | 23% | 23% |
| 1% | 15% | 19% | 18% | 19% |
| 2% | 24% | 31% | 36% | 35% |
| 0% | 8% | 12% | 8% | 10% |
| 9% | 17% | 20% | 24% | 23% |
| 0% | 14% | 21% | 22% | 24% |

| 7% | %16 | 19% | 18% | 16% |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 0% | 13% | 24% | 22% | 28% |
| 1% | 19% | 23% | 25% | 25% |
| 6% | 12% | 16% | 16% | 16% |

Table (2):

Attitudes by Political Affiliation (%)

| | Fateh | Islamist | Others |
|---|-------|----------|--------|
| Didn't expect a Hamas win | 81% | 48% | 59% |
| Support that Hamas must recognize PLO | 84% | 64% | 61% |
| Support Hamas participation in international conference | 90% | 90% | 87% |
| Support direct negotiations | 80% | 75% | 82% |
| Support Hamas recognition of Israel | 42% | 22% | 32% |
| Support a two-state solution | 67% | 52% | 57% |
| Oppose suicide attacks | 62% | 54% | 64% |
| Will immigrate if given opportunity | 26% | 11% | 20% |

Detailed Analysis

1. Positions Concerning the Agenda of the PNA

- Approximately 63% of respondents agree that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, whereas 29% disagree.
- Almost 70% of respondents call upon Hamas to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while 22% oppose such an action. Support for Hamas' recognition of the PLO is higher in Gaza (74%) than the West Bank (67%).
- 55% believe Hamas must recognize the Basic Law (Constitution) as approved by the outgoing PLC, while 33% oppose such recognition.
- 61% believe Hamas should recognize the Declaration of Independence approved by the Palestine National Council in 1988, while 24% are opposed.
- 50% of respondents believe the main source of decision-making should be the PNA, while 39% believe it should be the PLO. Support for the PLO as a decision-making entity is higher in Gaza (45%) than in the West Bank (35%).

2. The Peace Process

- About 90% believe the new Hamas-led government must enter into negotiations with Israel through an international conference. Only 7% oppose such a proposition.
- In addition, 78% support Hamas entering into direct negotiations with Israel to reach a final agreement on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while 19% of respondents are opposed to direct negotiations.
- 70% believe that Hamas must agree with international resolutions and conventions on Palestine, while 23% are opposed.
- 58% support a two-state solution (Palestine and Israel) based on international resolutions, while 39% are opposed.
- In the same context, 48% agree that Hamas must recognize the agreements signed by the PLO and Israel, while 43% are opposed.
- To stress the increasing tendency for negotiations, 60% of respondents oppose Hamas using suicide attacks on Israeli cities, while 35% support such tactics. These results illustrate a dramatic decline in support for suicide attacks, where in November 2001 approximately 75% supported such attacks, while 19% opposed them.
- Despite this overwhelming support for negotiations and a two-state solution, Palestinians are still not ready to push Hamas to recognize Israel at this point in time; 64% oppose Hamas recognizing the state of Israel now, while 30% believe Hamas should recognize Israel.

Attitudes towards these issues are influenced mostly by political affiliation. The differences between the various groups are illustrated in the following statements:

(Refer to Table # 2 in Annex 2)

- 84% of Fateh supporters believe that Hamas must recognize the PLO. This view is shared by 64% of Islamists^[1] and 61% of Others^[2].
- Supporters of all political groups equally support the participation of Hamas in an international peace conference.
- A majority of all groups support direct negotiations between Hamas and Israel (Fateh 80%; Islamists 75%; Others 82%).
- 42% of Fateh supporters feel that Hamas should recognize the state of Israel now, compared with 22% among Islamists and 32% among others.

- 67% of Fateh supporters support a two-state solution. Likewise, a majority of Islamists (52%) and Others (57%) support such a solution.
- 64% of Others, 62% of Fateh supporters, and 54% of Islamists oppose suicide attacks against Israeli cities.

3. Democratic Values

In general this poll confirms the commitment of Palestinians to democratic values. The results show the following:

- 97% support the freedom of expression and speech.
- 93% support regular and plural elections.
- 87% support a constitution based on equal rights for all citizens regardless of religion, while 11% oppose such a principle.
- 82% support a constitution based on equal rights for all citizens regardless of gender, while 16% oppose such a principle.

4. Evaluation of PLC Elections

- 59% of respondents said that they were satisfied with the outcome of the elections taking place in January 2006. In contrast, 23% said that they were not satisfied.
- 60% of the respondents said that they did not expect an overwhelming Hamas win, while 37% said that they did. Over 81% of Fateh supporters, 48% of Islamists, and 59% of Others and Independents did not expect the Hamas win in the PLC.
- Over 78% felt the PLC elections were free and fair, while 12% felt they were somewhat fair, and only 5% felt they were unfair.
 - 39% of the respondents said they had voted primarily for Hamas candidates at the district level, while 31% voted for Fateh candidates and 30% voted for Other and Independent candidates.

5. Reasons for non-participation

When respondents who were registered for the elections but didn't vote were questioned about the reasons behind their lack of participation, the following trends emerged:

• Being busy: 21% said they did not participate because they were busy doing other things on that day.

- Ambivalence: 20% said PLC elections are irrelevant and lead to no change in their lives.
- Inadequate lists and candidates: 13% said they were not convinced by the programs or competence of the lists and candidates running for elections.
- Logistical problems: 6% said they attempted to participate, but were unable to locate their voting center or were unable to find their names on the voter lists.
- Information problems: 3% said they did not have adequate information on the process and the candidates.

6. Voting Patterns and Political Support

Respondents were asked about their political support as well as for whom they would vote if elections took place today. The results reveal that a vote for a specific list does not imply automatic support for the list. Voting patterns are not a reflection of the political support as is revealed in the following results:

- If elections took place today and the same lists (as in latest PLC elections) participated, 50% would vote for Change and Reform (the list formed by Hamas), 38% for Fateh, and the remaining lists would receive very small percentages.
- Concerning political support, 40% said they support Hamas, while 30% said they support Fateh. Islamic Jihad and PFLP receive approximately 3% each. 22% say they are Independent.
- Support for Hamas is almost equal in the West Bank and Gaza, while support for Fateh is higher in Gaza (35%) than in the West Bank (27%).
- As for the reasons why people voted for a particular list, open-ended questions and focus groups with voters for the various lists enabled the research team to conclude the following overall patterns:

Reasons for Voting for Hamas [3]:

- Hamas is not corrupt; it could bring about reform
- Its leadership and candidates are competent and honest
- Hamas will be able to bring about internal security
- Hamas will improve living conditions
- Its program is based on equality and justice
- To punish Fateh and its leadership

- Their campaign was organized and convincing
- I agree with Hamas' political and ideological platform
- We are Muslims and Hamas refer to Sharia'
- I am a committed member of Hamas

Reasons for Voting for Fateh

- Fatch is the origin of the Palestinian revolution
- Fateh is the main actor in the struggle
- Fatch is the most capable of leading the Palestinians with its experience and relations
- To reach a peace agreement
- Fateh is moderate
- Faithful to Yasser Arafat
- Convinced by its political agenda and goals
- Competence of Fateh candidates
- To prevent Hamas from coming into power
- To guarantee international support
- Fatch is the main faction in the PLO
- It is the most popular
- I am a member in Fateh and I have interests
- Continuity

Reasons for not voting for Independent and Leftist groups

When asked why respondents voted for Hamas and not for other alternatives to Fateh, the following answers emerged:

- They do not have the power or the institutions/infrastructure to be a real alternative

- They did not deliver to the people in all fields of life
- They are more elitist and did not work with the masses
- Their agendas are not clear or known by the people
- Cannot trust them
- I am not convinced by their agenda
- They are against religion
- They are the same as Fateh; they work with Fateh and benefit from it
- They are not organized or united like Hamas
- They do not provide social services

7. Evaluation of the New Ministerial Cabinet

While it is deemed to be too early to evaluate the new government led by Prime Minister Ismael Haneyyeh, respondents did not hesitate to provide their input based on whatever little information they have on the new government.

- 48% of respondents perceive the newly-appointed ministers to be qualified for the job; 26% perceive them to be somewhat qualified, while 13% perceive them as unqualified. 13% were undecided.
- 64% felt Hamas is serious about engaging other political groups in the decision-making process, whereas 17% felt Hamas is somewhat serious, and 14% as not serious.
- In evaluating the performance of Prime Minister Ismael Haneyyeh, 64% said they feel his performance is good. Another 19% said his performance is fair, while only 6% said his performance is poor. Gaza respondents gave Prime Minister Haneyyeh a more favorable rating (75%) than West Bank respondents (57%) an 18 point difference.
- As for the performance of President Mahmoud Abbas, the poll shows an increase in his rating, where 54% evaluated his performance as good, compared with 41% in November 2005. In this poll, 27% evaluated his performance as fair and 15% viewed it as poor. Gaza respondents gave the President a more favorable rating (61%) than West Bank respondents (50%) an 11 point difference.

8. Priorities and Expectations

The poll results reveal that the new government is faced with a very crowded agenda and a long list of expectations. The results show the following:

- Internal issues were at the top of the Palestinian agenda; 90% considered the following as priorities: dealing with unemployment, uprooting corruption, ending chaos, and achieving economic development.
- Improving government services and solving social problems were a priority to 86% of the respondents.
- 85% of the respondents considered ending the occupation and dealing with the separation wall as priorities.
- Over 82% considered promoting democracy, consolidating personal and public freedoms, obtaining international funding, and improving diplomatic relations as priorities.
 - 80% said the promotion of the status of women is a priority.

While relatively high percentages place a priority on all of the above-mentioned issues, fewer Palestinians expect that the present government will be able to achieve them.

- 85% place an emphasis on ending the occupation, but only 26% believe the current government will be able to achieve that. 27% believe the government can do that to an extent, while more than 48% believe it will not be able to deliver.
- 90% believe that uprooting corruption is a priority, with 60% believing the government might be able to deliver on that. 61% believe the new government will be able to improve government services, and 55% believe it will be able to end chaos and insecurity.
- In general, 48% feel the Hamas win will improve Palestinian chances in achieving independence and establishing a state. Another 56% feel this win will improve internal conditions, and 50% feel it will lead to more democracy.
- The more educated, the wealthy, the less religious, and male respondents are less optimistic that a Hamas win will lead to positive change compared with other social categories. For example, 60% of the most educated (compared with 41% of the least educated), 51% of the wealthy (compared with 38% of those with the least income), 50% of men (compared with 37% of women), and 75% of the least religious (compared with 36% of the most religious) do not expect that a Hamas win will lead to ending the occupation. (Refer to Table # 1 in Annex 2)

9. Evaluation of Living Conditions

• 39% of respondents describe the economic conditions of their families as bad or very bad. Another 39% describe them as fair, while 22% describe their economic

conditions as good or very good. There is a gap between Gaza and the West Bank, with 47% of Gaza respondents describing the economic conditions of their families as bad or very bad, compared with 34% among West Bank respondents.

- The overall view of Palestinian reality as a whole is even more dismal; 67% describe the present situation of the Palestinian people as bad or very bad, while 27% describe it as fair, and only 6% describe it as good or very good.
- In the same context, 18% of respondents said they would be wiling to immigrate if given the opportunity. This percentage has not increased over the last five years and is equal between the West Bank and Gaza.
- The percentage of young people who are willing to immigrate is alarming; 34% of the age group 18-27 and 28% of the age group 28-37 said they would be willing to immigrate.

10. Evaluation of Public Opinion Polls

While we realize that one could not place Palestinian institutions in one basket when it comes to evaluation of their performance and quality of work, we looked for some overall indicators as well as specific ones.

- When asked to evaluate the overall experience of opinion polling in Palestine, 58% of respondents said they believe it was a good experience. Another 27% said that the experience was somewhat good. In contrast, only 9% said it was not good. 7% of respondents were undecided.
- In terms of trust in polls, 48% of respondents said they trust opinion polls, and 30% said they trust them to some extent. At the same time, 15% said they do not trust them.

Annex 3

Sample distribution

| Region | % | Type of locality | % | Refugee Status | % |
|-----------|----|------------------|----|----------------|----|
| West Bank | 62 | City | 53 | Refugee | 38 |

^{[1].} Supporters of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

^[2] Others include small parties and independents.

^[3] In descending order according to frequency.

| Gaza Strip | 38 | Village- | 31 | Non-refugee | 62 |
|--------------------------|-----|--------------------|-----|---------------------|----|
| Governorate | 0/0 | town | 1.0 | Education | % |
| | | Camp Gender | 16 | | |
| Jenin | 6 | | | Illiterate | 20 |
| Tubas | 2 | Male | 52 | Preparatory | 21 |
| Tulkarm | 3 | Female | 48 | Elementary | 31 |
| Nablus | 10 | Marital status | 0/0 | Secondary | 17 |
| Qalqilya | 2 | Single | 23 | Diploma | 5 |
| Salfit | 1 | Married | 73 | B.A. or more | 6 |
| Jericho | 2 | Others | 4 | Place of | |
| Ramallah | 9 | Age | % | Residence prior | % |
| Jerusalem | 10 | 18-22 | 19 | to 1994 | |
| Bethlehem | 3 | 23-27 | 16 | West Bank & Gaza | 91 |
| Hebron | 14 | 28-32 | 14 | Abroad | 9 |
| North Gaza | 7 | 33-37 | 12 | Income (NIS)* | % |
| Gaza City | 14 | 38-42 | 10 | No Income | 4 |
| Deir al-Balah | 5 | 43-47 | 7 | Less than 700 | 25 |
| Khan Younis | 8 | 48-52 | 5 | 700-1000 | 22 |
| Rafah | 4 | > 52 | 17 | 1001-1700 | 17 |
| Reasons for unemployment | % | Work Status | 0/0 | 1701-2500 | 6 |
| Housewives | 58 | Working | 29 | 2501-3000 | 17 |
| Students | 11 | Not Working | 71 | More than 3000 | 9 |
| Retired | 5 | Religiosity | % | | • |
| Seeking work | 20 | Religious | 54 | | |
| Others | 6 | Somewhat religious | 43 | | |
| | | Not religious | 3 | | |
| 1 \$ = 4.6 NIS | | | - | | |