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|  | [Opinion Polls](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/opinionpolls/)    **Poll No. 7**   Living conditions, evaluation of Institutions, re-building Palestinian society, evaluation of emergency fundingattitudes toward U.S. assistance negotiations   **[**[**Work Team**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll7/work_team.html)**] [**[**Analysis of Results**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll7/analysis.html)**] [**[**Political Context**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll7/context.html)**] [**[**Results of Survey #7**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll7/results.html)**] [**[**Sample Distribution**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll7/sample_distribution.html)**]**  **[** [**باللغة العربية**](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/arabic/opinionpolls/poll7/)**]**     |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Analysis of Results   Section One: The impact of the Israeli incursion on living conditions    1)      Unprecedented deterioration in economic living conditions    ·        40% of Palestinian households have no working breadwinner.  ·        Another 40% of the households have a monthly income that is less than $200 per month. The percentage is 45% in Gaza and 37% in the West Bank.  ·        Over 17% of the households have no source of income whatsoever; in Gaza the rate is 23%, compared with 13% in the West Bank.  ·        45% of respondents described their economic conditions as (bad) or (very bad).    2)      Lasting Psychological and emotional impact    ·        68% of the respondents reported that children within the household are facing emotional difficulties.  ·        Feelings of confusion are widespread; on the one hand the majority of respondents (92%) feel sad and worried (87%), on the other hand, the same majority feel (resilient) and (proud).  ·        71% feel insecure about their lives, their children, and their property.  ·        Pessimism is on the rise; this poll shows the percentage of those self-declared pessimists to be 37%, increasing from 30% in June 2001. Still, 36% said that they were optimistic, and 26% felt (in between pessimism and optimism).    3)      A large group has received assistance, but say it is not sufficient    ·        48% of respondents say they have received some emergency assistance during the Intifada.  ·        58% of those who received such assistance say it was (insufficient).  ·        Another 48% of the respondents say they (don’t trust) institutions responsible for the distribution of emergency assistance.  ·        Distrust in institutions working in the field of emergency assistance is higher in the West Bank (52%) than Gaza (43%).    Section Two: Evaluation of the performance of institutions during the latest incursion    1)      International solidarity groups get the most favorable evaluation; while international human rights institutions and local councils get the least favorable evaluation    ·        50% of the respondents gave international voluntary groups in solidarity with the Palestinian people a (good) evaluation. The favorable rating was 56% in Gaza and 46% in the West Bank.  ·        Health organizations were also evaluated positively by the respondents as 50% said that their performance was (good).  ·        (Political groups) that also received 50% favorable rating.  ·        Palestinian NGOs received a high rating, with 48% of respondents saying their performance was (good).  ·        The least favorable evaluation went to security agencies as 33% said that their performance was (good), while 41% said it was (weak).  ·        Also evaluated unfavorably were the local councils, as 27% of respondents said their performance was (good), while 39% said it was (weak).    2)      The Red Crescent & the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) get most positive ratings    When asked about the performance of specific organizations, the respondents gave the following ratings:    ·        The Red Crescent received the highest rating of all 10 organizations listed in the poll, where 77% of those who have enough information about its performance said they view its performance as (good). The Red Crescent is a quasi-governmental institution.  It has large fleet of ambulances that provide rescue and emergency assistance throughout the West Bank and Gaza.  ·        UPMRC scored second in positive ratings where 65% viewed its performance as (good). The rating for the rest of the organizations is listed in the following table.     |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Percentage of those who said that the performance was (Good) (descending order)** | | | | | | | Rank | Organization | % | Rank | Organization | % | | 1 | Red Crescent | 77 | 6 | Red Cross | 57 | | 2 | UPMRC | 65 | 7 | UNRWA | 55 | | 3 | Civil Defense | 64 | 8 | Ministry of Social Affairs | 42 | | 4 | Ministry of Education | 60 | 9 | Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) | 36 | | 4 | Ministry of Health | 60 | 10 | Ministry of Public Works | 32 |     It is illuminating to notice the varying degrees of visibility of these institutions among Palestinians. About 36% said that they couldn’t judge the performance of PARC because they didn’t have (sufficient information). About 30% said the same about the work of UNRWA (see the following table).       |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Percentage of those who said that they were unfamiliar with the work of the following institutions (descending order)** | | | | | | | Rank | Organization | % | Rank | Organization | % | | 1 | PARC | 36 | 4 | Civil Defense | 23 | | 2 | UNRWA | 32 | 7 | Red Cross | 19 | | 3 | Ministry of Social Affairs | 29 | 8 | Red Crescent | 17 | | 4 | Ministry of Public Works | 23 | 9 | Ministry of Health | 12 | | 4 | UPMRC | 23 | 10 | Ministry of Education | 9 |         Section Three: Institutional Evaluation & Reform    1.      Priorities and Objectives: Alleviation of Poverty & Resolving the Unemployment Problem are top priorities    When Palestinian respondents were asked about priorities in the re-construction period, the following responses emerged:    ·        Concern focused on immediate needs related to economic hardships; 98% believe that focus must be placed on providing the poor with financial and in-kind assistance.  ·        At the same time, respondents were concerned about long term solutions to the unemployment problem, where 95% felt that was a priority.  ·        Palestinians are also concerned about the rule-of-law and institutional reform.    Percentage of respondents evaluating each priority as (very important or important):    1.      Provide the poor with assistance (98%)  2.      Invest in job creation programs (96%)  3.      Combat social problems (94%)  4.      Re-build infrastructure (93%)  5.      Reinforce the rule-of-law (91%)  6.      Improve the performance of PNA institutions (90%)    2)      Steps toward the improvement of internal conditions: community participation and the rule-of-law are viewed as key elements to successful reform    The most important step towards improving internal conditions is the development of the role of the judiciary, followed by reinforcing the role of the police. The respondents viewed the improvement of internal conditions such as community participation and local council reform as being key. The results show a deep interest among Palestinians in democratic practices, as they emphasize the role of neighborhood committees, local councils, workers’ and professional unions, NGOs, and elections (as illustrated in the following):    Steps viewed as important to the re-building process (descending order)    1.      Develop the judiciary (91%)  2.      Reinforce the role of the police (90%)  3.      Establish neighborhood committees (90%)  4.      Promote the role of local councils (90%)  5.      Promote the role of NGOs (90%)  6.      Promote the role of unions (87%)  7.      Re-organize the security agencies (86%)  8.      Re-organize the ministerial cabinet (81%)  9.      Conduct parliamentary elections (81%)  10.  Conduct local elections (81%)  11.  Resurrect PLO institutions (79%)  12.  Promote the role of political groups (78%)    Section Four: No to American governmental funding; majority supports non-governmental assistance.    ·        About 71% oppose the idea of receiving American governmental funding for emergency assistance (food and medicine). Opposition is higher in the West Bank (73%) compared with Gaza (67%).  ·        Opposition to American governmental funding to (development – roads, water etc.) was at 63%, higher in the West Bank (66%) than Gaza (57%).  ·        Another 65% opposed receiving governmental money channeled through non-governmental or private organizations.  ·        At the same time, a majority supported receiving funding from American NGOs for emergency needs, where (53%) supported such funding and 42% opposed funding. Support in the West Bank was 50%, compared with 59% in Gaza.  ·        Support for receiving non-governmental funding for development purposes was at 55%, with 60% in Gaza supportive compared to 52% in the West Bank.    Section Five: A continuing commitment to peace    In spite of the prevailing hardship and the continuing Israeli military presence, closure, and human rights abuses, the current poll revealed that (peace) is a strategic choice for the Palestinians.    ·        A majority of respondents (63%) supported the continuation of negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis until a final resolution to the conflict is reached. Support for negotiations reached 67% in Gaza and 61% in the West Bank.  ·        At the same time, 86% of Palestinians supports a permanent solution of the conflict based on United Nations Resolutions (A Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with east Jerusalem as its capital and a just resolution of the refugee problem). The percentage of support for this proposal was higher in Gaza (89%) than in the West Bank (84%).    Section Six: hardship in West Bank results in widespread feelings of insecurity, and a more critical stand regarding PNA institutions and negotiations    ·        75% of West Bank residents said they feel insecure about their lives, the welfare of their children, and their property. This is compared with 68% in Gaza.  ·        In addition, 40% of West Bank respondents said that they were (pessimistic), compared with 32% among Gaza respondents.  ·        This is very much related to the tight closure in the West Bank that has brought almost all activities to a halt. The tight closure over the two regions reduced the poverty gap between respondants, as the poll shows that 44% of Gaza households have no breadwinner, compared with 38% in the West Bank.[[1]](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll7/analysis.html" \l "_ftn1" \o ")  ·        The destruction of PNA institutions and civil society intstitutions by the Israeli military is seen as being more widespread in the West Bank than in Gaza. While facing extreme difficulties, Gaza institutions remain more capable at delivering basic services under the current circumstances. This reality is the likely cause of a more positive evaluation of PNA institutions. For example, 42% of the Gaza sample said that the performance of security agencies was (good). This is compared with 27% among the West Bank sample. In general, the evaluation of institutions was more positive in Gaza than in the West Bank (as shown in the following table).     |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Percentage of those who evaluated the performance of the following institutions as (good) ranked based on the gap size between Gaza & West Bank** | | | | | Institution | West Bank | Gaza | Gap | | Political parties | 42% | 61% | 19% | | Security agencies | 27% | 42% | 15% | | UNRWA | 49% | 62% | 13% | | International Solidarity groups | 46% | 56% | 10% | | Human rights organizations | 35% | 43% | 8% | | PARC | 38% | 32% | 6% | | UPMRC | 63% | 67% | 4% | | Ministry of Health | 54% | 67% | 3% |     ·        The relative calm in Gaza and the presence of PNA institutions also likely resulted in a more favorable view of the peace process, as 67% of Gaza respondents supported the return to negotiations, compared with 61% in the West Bank.    Section Seven: A Gender Gap    ·        In general, women viewed PNA institutions more positively than did men.  ·        However, women are less trusting of institutions responsible for the distribution of emergency assistance, as 23% of the male respondents said that they are trustful, compared with 13% among the female respondents.  ·        Women are more supportive of the return to negations (70%) than men (57%).  ·        At the same time, women are less supportive of receiving U.S funding than men.  ·        Most of this gap might be explained by variance in education among men and women, where men in the sample are more educated than women. The educated (whether men or women) tend to be more critical and less favorable of the peace process than the less educated.    Section Eight: The educated are most critical    ·        The illiterate and the educated are the most pessimistic, as over 43% of them said that they are (pessimistic).  ·        The educated are the least supportive of the return to negotiations. About 49% of BA holders oppose negotiations, while only 28% of the illiterate share that view. 80% of BA holders are willing to accept a permanent solution based on UN resolutions compared with 90% among the illiterate.    Section Nine: The young have the most hard-line positions    ·        The results show that middle aged Palestinians (30-45) feel the least secure (a group of mostly married couples with young children, financial commitments, and in constant need to protect their children). This group also feels the most (worried) about the future and the most (angry). However, they are the ones who support the return to negotiations the most, as 73% middle aged Palestinians supported such return. This is compared with 57% among the age group (16-17) and 55% among the age group (18-22). | |  | | | |  |
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