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|   | [Opinion Polls](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/opinionpolls/)Poll No. 4**Survey # 4: Livelihood, Negotiations, the Future, and TV and Radio Stations****[ Analysis of Results ] [** [**Detailed Results**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/results.html) **] [** [**Sample Distribution**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/sample.html) **] [** [**In Arabic**](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/arabic/opinionpolls/poll4/) **]** **Main Results** 1. In line with the continuous escalation of violent means to repress the Intifada, there has been a continuous growth of support in Palestinian public opinion towards suicide attacks on Israeli civilians. At the start of the Oslo Peace Process, in 1994 when public opinion polls showed great optimism in and support of that process, only 18% of the public supported suicide attacks. In February 2001, in the context of Ehud Barak's military strategy of putting down the al Aqsa *Intifada*, support for suicide attacks jumped to 53%. One hundred days after Ariel Sharon took office, and following continued escalation of military force against Palestinian civilians (including the use of F-16 bombers), this poll found 75% of the public in support of suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. (*It is important to note, that 2/3 of this poll was undertaken BEFORE the killing of Israelis in Tel Aviv on June 1st-- thus it cannot be used to measure reactions to that event)*. At the same time, support for negotiations has declined to an all time low (at 50%) compared with an average of 75% over the last few years.
2. The results show that the current Intifada and Israeli siege have contributed to a greater convergence of views on some issues (e.g., the continuation of the Intifada, suicide attacks), and a continuing gap on other issues (e.g., change in cabinet, assistance provision, evaluation of services and local councils).
3. Middle class and middle age Palestinians are increasingly viewing the various issues with skepticism.  Their attitudes are becoming comparable to those of younger Palestinians who hold “hard-line” views especially in relation to the “peace process” and the PNA. Previous polls have generally indicated support for negotiations and opposition to suicide attacks among middle class and middle age Palestinians. In contrast, this poll shows decreasing support for negotiations and higher support for suicide attacks.
4. The gap between the views of Fateh supporters and Hamas supporters has declined on issues relating to the Intifada, negotiations, and suicide attacks. At the same time, the views of Hamas supporters are more tolerant of the PNA than at any previous time. ([See Table 1 at the bottom](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/analysis.html#t1))
5. Feelings of insecurity and pessimism are widespread among Palestinians. Over 96% of therespondents have been feeling distressed and over 81% of Gaza respondents noticed increasing emotional traumas among children.
6. Support for the continuation of the Intifada remains equally high (72%) in the West Bank and Gaza. This same percent of respondents sees the ultimate goals of the Intifada as liberation and an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza.
7. Reactions to the Mitchell Report are mixed. While the overwhelming majority (again 72%) are against ending the Intifada solely in exchange for a settlement freeze, a much lower (49%) are firmly against a cease-fire (Our field researchers confirmed that the majority of respondents were in disagreement with how the Report uses the term “violence”. The respondents insited on using the term “resistance” instead. They also said that what is called “violence” by the Report is only a reaction to Israeli use of excessive military force).
8. Support for President Arafat has increased over the last 3 months.
9. Respondents give the PNA a positive evaluation for its political position towards the Intifada, but it does less well in assessments of its role in responding to the populations emergency needs.
10. The results show variance in views between the less educated and the educated. ([See Table 2 at the bottom](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/analysis.html#t2))
11. Support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad is on the rise (especially in Gaza), while support for Fateh is declining.
12. Of the international actors, the United States receives the least favorable evaluation in terms of its role played during the Intifada.
13. **In regards to news about the Intifada, Al-Jazeera is the most popular and Abu Dabi is the most trusted. Palestinian stations score high. Israeli stations are not trusted.**
14. **60% of educated persons surveyed oppose providing children with any “military training” during summer camps. In contrast, 68% of the illiterate support such training.**

 **Analysis of the Results**1. **Feelings of personal insecurity are widespread among Palestinians**
	* In August 2000, a few days before the advent of the Aqsa Intifada, 18% felt insecure. At the present time,  72% of Palestinians feel insecure about their own safety and the safety of their families and property (54% increase). In addition, 14% described their feelings “between secure and insecure.” Only 13% feel safe at the present time, compared with 63% last August.http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/image002.gif
	* Feelings of insecurity in the West Bank are equal to those in Gaza. However, it must be noted that refugee camp residents feel the most insecure. The rate in refugee camps is 78% compared with 73% in cities and 69% in villages.
	* Feelings of insecurity also vary among age groups and by education. About 66% of the less educated and 75% of the educated feel insecure about their safety and the safety of their families.  With respect to age, Palestinians between 28-32 are the most insecure about their families and their property, followed by Palestinians between 33-42. These groups are mostly comprised of couples with young children, at a stage of life where they have responsibilities to secure a reasonable livelihood for their children.
	* This is confirmed by the fact that married respondents feel more insecure (75%) than single respondents (64%).
	* Feelings of insecurity are higher among male respondents (75%) than female respondents (69%). This might be related to the higher unemployment rates among men and the inability of many parents (most of the breadwinners are males) to have any control over the future of their employment.
	* Palestinians working in NGOs feel the most insecure (86%) about their safety, and the safety of their families and property. This is compared with 76% of private sector and government employees.
	* In terms of type of work, merchants feel the most insecurity (85%), followed by laborers, employees, and professionals (all at 80%).
	* It was clear that there is a correlation between feelings of insecurity and the level of household income. About 42% of the highest income bracket feel insecure, compared with over 72% in the lowest bracket.
2. **Pessimism is on the rise**
	* The percentage of those who are pessimistic about the future has increased form 17% last August, to 30% at the present time. In addition, the percentage of those who described their future outlook  “between optimism and pessimism” has increased from 23% to 30%. This implies that the percentage of those who expressed optimism is 39%, a decrease of 20% from last August. http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/image004.gif
	* The results show no significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza. However, refugee camp residents are the least optimistic, with 35% expressing optimism, compared with 38% in villages and 42% in cities.
	* The youngest (16-17) and the oldest Palestinians (over 42) are the most optimistic, with 48% of the youngest declaring optimism and over 45% of the oldest feeling the same way. This is compared with 24% among the age group (28-32) and 31% among those (23-27).
	* The educated are generally less optimistic than the less educated.
	* As married Palestinians feel more insecure, they also feel less optimistic about the future.
	* Government employees are the most optimistic (44%), compared with private sector employees (39%) and NGOs employees (29%).
	* The most optimistic according to type of work, are the professionals, the retired, and the farmers, while the least optimistic are the “unemployed”, the merchants, and the monthly salaried employees.
3. **Feelings of insecurity and pessimism are associated with feelings of distress.**
	* About 95% of the respondents have been feeling distressed lately, 67% of them continually.
	* Feelings of continuous distress are more widespread in Gaza (70%) than in the West Bank (65%).
	* Feelings of continuous distress are highest among the least educated (reaching 80%) compared with 55% among the most educated.
	* There is a direct correlation between age and feelings of distress.  About 84% of Palestinians over 52 years old feel continuous distress, while 38% of younger Palestinians (16-17) feel continuous distress.
	* Women have been feeling distressed (72%) more than men (63%).
	* The unemployed feel continuous distress the most, followed by professionals and housewives. The least distress is cited among students and employees (two groups that are generally younger).
4. **The majority of children are suffering from emotional traumas.**
	* 75% of the respondents believe that children around them have been facing more emotional problems than before the Intifada; the rate in Gaza is 81% and in the West Bank is 70%.
	* Suffering from trauma among children is highest in the following districts: Salfeet (a district completely surrounded by Jewish settlements), north of Gaza, south of Gaza, and Bethlehem. The lowest rates of  trauma is in the Ramallah and Jerusalem districts (this is possibly due to the active role of various institutions in providing child-related services and entertainment programs for children in these two districts).
	* Children in refugee camps (83%) are facing more emotional problems than children in cities (79%), and villages (68%).
	* Emotional problems are more widespread among the poorest, where 75% of those who have a monthly income (less than $420) reported that their children are facing emotional traumas. This is compared with 55% among children from households in the income bracket ($1270-1700).
5. **Support for the Intifada and opposition to the Mitchell Report**
	* Support for the Intifada continues equally in Gaza and in the West Bank; as 78% of the respondents supported its continuation.
	* The majority (72%) will not accept stopping the Intifada solely in exchange for a freeze over settlement building.
	* The same majority (72%) expressed that the Intifada’s ultimate goal is ending the Israeli Occupation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
	* At the same time, 76% of the respondents feel that the Intifada will contribute positively to achieving Palestinian goals of liberation and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as stipulated by United Nations Resolutions.
	* Although 72% oppose ending the Intifada in return for a settlement freeze, only 49% oppose the proposed cease-fire as stipulated by the Mitchell Report. 28% support the Mitchell cease-fire proposal and 16% equivocally support it.
	* A finding that may be closely related to the stance towards the cease-fire is that 83% of respondents oppose young Palestinians using residential areas to fire at Israeli settlements.
	* These findings tend to suggest that the majority of the public despite personal fears and losses are committed to the Intifada because they view it as the means to end the Occupation. They are unwilling to trade losses they have incurred for something less (a settlement freeze). At the same time, reactions to the cease-fire suggest that there is willingness for some compromise on means, as long as it is linked to forgetting the Intifada as a whole.
6. **Support for negotiations with Israel declines.**
	* At the present time, a majority (50%) still supports the continuation of political negotiations with Israel, while 46% oppose them. This reflects a significant decline of 20% from the period of February 2001when the rate of support was 70%. These figures are the same for the West bank and Gaza.http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/image006.gif
	* While half othe respondents continue to support negotiations, a higher 59% oppose the continuation of security coordination with Israel.
7. **Support for “suicide attacks” increases from 18% in 1994 to 75% in 2001.**
	* Support for suicide attacks against Israelis inside Israel has increased from 18% in April 1994 and 21% in March 1996 *(See CPRS Polls)*, to 75% at the present time. The almost exact opposite was the case the first time these attitudes were measured; in April 1994 at the beginning of the Oslo Peace Process, 74% of respondents were opposed to these attacks.http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll4/image008.gif
	* Previous polls have indicated a negative correlation between progress in the peace process and improvement in economic conditions on one hand, and support for suicide attacks on the other hand.  In April 1994, 50% of Palestinians were optimistic; and over 71% supported negotiations.  Our previous poll in February 2001 showed that 69% of Palestinian households had at least one of its members losing his/her job during the previous 4 months. In addition, 73% of Palestinian households have seen their income decline and 27% have completely lost their source of income.
	* There is some correlation between feelings of security about own safety and the safety of one’s family and property, and support of suicide attacks. 76% of those who feel insecure support suicide attacks, compared with 69% of those who feel secure.
	* Support for suicide attacks in Gaza is equal to that in the West Bank.  Opposition to these attacks is however is higher in Gaza, while the percentage of those unsure is higher in the West Bank.
	* Support for suicide attacks is higher among male respondents (80%) than female respondents (70%).
	* Teenage Palestinians are the most supportive of suicide attacks, where 88% of those between 16-17 are supportive. In contrast, 70% of older Palestinians are supportive.
	* Support for suicide attacks is directly correlated with type of work. Professionals and retired Palestinians are the least supportive of suicide attacks. In fact, 48% of professionals oppose (or uncertain about) these attacks. The most supportive are students (87%), craftsmen (85%), farmers (82%), and the unemployed (77%).
	* Private sector and government employees are more supportive of suicide attacks (80%) than NGOs employees (70%).
	* Opposition to suicide attacks increases with household income; 30% of those with a monthly income of ($1250-$1700) oppose such attacks, while 19% of those in the lowest income bracket (less than $420) share the same view.
	* Support for suicide attacks is not influenced by the degree of educational attainment.
	* Previous polls have shown a major division between Fateh supporters and Hamas supporters over the issue of suicide attacks. In fact, the gap between them had reached over 60% in previous polls. While this gap is still distinguishable, it has declined dramatically, as the current poll shows that 83% of Hamas supporters and 72% of Fateh supporters are supportive of suicide attacks (a gap of 11%).
8. **The USA receives the most negative evaluation for its role with respect to the current Intifada**
	* 93% evaluate the role played by the US with respect to the current Intifada as “negative.”  This compares to 75% negative ratings for both the EU and the UN.  61% evaluate the roles played by Arab countries with respect to the current Intifada as being negative, while 42% evaluate the role of Islamic countries as being negative. The least dissatisfaction with roles played with respect to the current Intifada was registered with the PNA at 14%.
	* On a geographical basis, no significant differences exist in regards to this issue, except for the evaluation of the role of the PNA.  Fewer Gazans evaluate its role positively (49%) when compared with West Bank residents (54%). In contrast, there is higher positive evaluation of Islamic countries in Gaza than there is in the West Bank.
	* Gender and public perception regarding the roles of the various parties are correlated. In general, men are much more negative in their evaluation of all parties (except for the PNA) than are women. For example, 71% of men see the role played by Arab countries with respect to the current Intifada as “negative,” compared to 52% of women who feel this way. More than 85% of men evaluate the role of the UN as “negative”, while 66% of the women respondents feel this way. In general, more women are in the category of “between negative and positive” than men. For both men and women, the USA received the most negative evaluation (men – 97%, women – 90%), and the PNA received the least negative evaluation (men – 16%, women – 13%).
	* No significant difference exists in terms of employment sector (i.e., private, government, and NGOs) regarding the role of the US. In fact, 100% of the NGOs employees evaluated the US role as being “negative.”
	* Merchants are the least satisfied with the PNA with respect to the Intifada; 32% of them evaluated the PNA’s performance negatively. Professionals and employees are the least satisfied with the US in this regard.
	* A significant gap exists between the educated and the less educated concerning their evaluation of the roles played by the various parties. For example, 64% of the educated see the role of Islamic countries negatively, while 38% of the less educated share that view. In addition, about 86% of the educated see the roles played by the EU and the UN as negative, while 72% of the less educated share that view. The gap is much less when it comes to evaluating the role of the US, as 99% of the educated and 92% of the less educated evaluate the US role as being negative.
	* Education was not a factor in shaping opinions about the role of the PNA in the Intifada.
	* No significant difference exists between Fateh and Hamas supporters in terms of their evaluation of various parties (with the exception of the PNA). Over 90% of Fateh supporters and 92% of Hamas supporters view the role of the US negatively. In contrast, 21% of Hamas supporters and 5% of Fateh supporters view the role of the PNA negatively.
9. **The PNA gets a positive evaluation for its general political role in supporting the Intifada, but does less well on specific issues.**

**General Role:*** + Only 14% of all respondents were completely negative in their evaluation of the PNA's general role in supporting the Intifada.
	+ However, there is significant differences in regards to this issue by region, fewer Gazans evaluate the PNA's role positively (49%) in comparison with West Bank residents (54%). In contrast, there is a more positive evaluation of Islamic countries in Gaza than in the West Bank. A slightly higher negative evaluation of the PNA exists among men (16%) than among women (13%).
	+ 21% of Hamas supporters compared to only 5% of Fateh supporters view the general  role of the PNA negatively.
	+ Merchants are the least satisfied with the general role of the PNA in the Intifada, where 32% of them evaluated its performance negatively
	+ Education was not a factor in shaping opinions about the general role of the PNA in the Intifada.

**Specific Role:*** + Palestinians are split over the evaluation of the PNA’s performance in assisting families hurt by Israeli bombing of Palestinian residential areas (27% positive, 38% fair, and 23% negative).
	+ The majority (64%) believes that the PA is not providing sufficient assistance to those who became unemployed because of the Israeli siege.
	+ 59% believe that the PA has no economic plan in to deal with the current crisis; only 11% believe that it has such a plan.
	+ 45% believe that the PA has no plan to deal with emerging social problems; only 19% believe that it has such a plan.
	+ 52% believe that cash and in-kind assistance is not provided to those who deserve it. In contrast, 19% believe that it is distributed to those who deserve it; and 27% see that is the case “to some extent.”
	+ 40% feel that there is a need for replacing the current ministerial cabinet; and 48% don’t feel that way at the present time.
	+ 43% feel that local councils are representing the interests of the local community. In contrast, 47% feel that these councils either represent personal and family interests (32%) or the interests of the PNA (15%).
	+ The majority (55%) feels that local councils don’t engage members of the community in important decisions made concerning them.
1. **Increase in the popularity of President Yassir Arafat.**
	* The poll showed an increase in the positive evaluation of President Arafat, where 58% positively evaluated his performance, as compared to 47% in February 2001, and 45% in November 2000. Another 26% said that his performance is “fair,” while 12% evaluated his performance as “negative.”
	* Previous polls have shown the evaluation of President Arafat to be more favorable in Gaza than in the West Bank. The current poll shows no difference between the two areas in regards to this issue.
	* In general, the President receives a less favorable evaluation among the educated and professionals. The poll shows that 60% of the less educated evaluate the President as being positive, compared with 50% among the more educated. Professionals and students give the President the least favorable evaluation (with 41% evaluating his performance as positive). In contrast, farmers, laborers and the retired give him the most favorable evaluation (over 75%.)
	* The President’s positive evaluation is also related to age, where President Arafat receives a 53% approval rate among the youngest Palestinians (16-22) and a 67% approval rating among Palestinians over 52 years old.
	* The evaluation of President Arafat’s performance is least favorable among employees in NGOs, where 39% approve of his performance during the Intifada. This is compared with 61% in the private sector and 57% among government employees.
	* President Arafat’s performance is most favorable among the wealthiest Palestinians, as 80% evaluated his performance positively. Middle class Palestinians are the least satisfied, as 45% approved of the President’s performance. Among the poor, the President’s approval rating was 59%.
	* 45% of Hamas supporters evaluated the performance of the President as “positive, ”and an additional 30% characterized it as being “fair”. In contrast, 77% of Fateh supporters characterize the President’s performance as positive, and 16% characterize it as “fair.”
2. **Evaluation of the Media’s coverage of the current Intifada**
	* In relation to media coverage of news concerning the current Intifada, Abu Dhabi TV, Al-Jazeera TV, and local (private) stations are considered to be the most trusted.
	* For news, Al-Jazeera is the most watched station.
	* Gaza respondents are more inclined to watch the news. The rural nature of the West Bank where many villages have no electricity and therefore no TVs or satellite services is likely to account for part of this difference. The only two news outlets watched more in the West Bank than in Gaza are Jordan TV and Palestinian local stations.
	* The more educated are more skeptical of all stations’ coverage of the Intifada. The only exception is Abu Dhabi TV where there is no significant difference between the educated and the less educated; both groups trust its coverage equally.  75% of the educated trust Abu-Dhabi’s coverage, while 63% trust Al-Jazeera’s coverage.
	* Trust in Al-Jazeera TV and Abu Dhabi TV is higher among Hamas supporters than Fateh supporters. Almost 80% of Hamas supporters trust Al-Jazeera, while 74% of Fateh supporters trust it. 83% of Hamas supporters trust Abu-Dhabi TV, while 75% of Fateh supporters trust it.
	* Trust in Abu Dhabi TV is equally distributed among government and non-government employees.  Trust in Al-Jazeera TV is higher among private sector employees than the government and NGOs sectors.
	* The Palestinian official stations’ coverage of the current Intifada is trusted more by Fateh supporters than Hamas supporters. However, 53% of Hamas supporters trust Palestinian TV, while 60% trust Palestinian Radio.  Also, government employees are less trusting of both official stations’ coverage than are non-governmental employees.

 **The various stations are ranked below according to the percentage of their viewer-ship (in descending order):**1. **Al-Jazeera (Satellite news station)**
	* Al-Jazeera received the highest viewer-ship and most positive evaluation for its coverage of the Intifada.
	* 59% of the respondents said that they trust its news about the Intifada. 21% said that they trust it on some occasions. 4% said that they don’t trust its news.
	* About 16% said that they don’t view the station either because they don’t have satellite television or don’t care to watch it.
	* Among those who watch the news through Al-Jazeera, 70% said that they always trust its news coverage of the Intifada. 26% said they trust it sometimes. 4% said that they don’t trust it.
	* Trust and viewer-ship of Al-Jazeera are almost equal in both the West Bank and Gaza.
2. **Abu-Dhabi (Satellite Station-variety of programs including news)**
	* Abu Dhabi’s news is less watched when compared to Al-Jazeera. 30% of the respondents said that they don’t watch the news on Abu-Dhabi either because they don’t have satellite services or don’t care to watch it. This could also be due to the fact that it is not a specialized news station like Al-Jazeera.
	* In general, 53% of the respondents said that they trust Abu-Dhabi’s news. In addition, 13% said that they trust it sometimes, and only 2.5% said that they don’t trust it.
	* Among those who view the station, 77% said that they trust its news. 19% said that they trust it sometimes, and 4% said that they don’t trust it.
	* Abu-Dhabi is both watched and trusted more in Gaza than in the West Bank. About 33% of the West Bank sample couldn’t evaluate Abu-Dhabi’s news either because they don’t get the station or don’t care to watch it. This is compared with 25% in Gaza.
	* All in all, Al-Jazeera and Abu-Dhabi are competing in terms of trust and viewer-ship.
3. **Palestinian Official Radio (Voice of Palestine)**
	* 46% of the respondents said that they trust Palestinian Official Radio in terms of its news coverage of the Intifada. 21% said that they trust it sometimes, and 5% said that they don’t trust it.
	* Over 27% said that they are unable to evaluate Palestinian Official Radio either because they don’t get its transmission or don’t care to follow its news.
	* Among those who follow the news on Palestinian Radio, 64% said that they trust it. In addition, 30% said that they trust it sometimes, and 6% said that they don’t trust it.
4. **Palestinian Official TV – PBC (both regular and satellite station):**
	* 47% of the respondents said that they trust Palestinian TV’s news coverage of the Intifada. At the same time, 29% said that they trust it sometimes, and 5% said they don’t trust it.
	* 17% said they are unable to evaluate its coverage of the Intifada news either because they don’t get its transmission or don’t care to watch it.
	* 22% of West Bank respondents and 9% in Gaza respondents don’t watch Palestinian TV.
	* Among those who watch Palestinian TV, 64% trust its news, 30% trust it sometimes, and 6% don’ trust it.
5. **Palestinian local-private stations:**
	* Over 36% said that they are unable to evaluate the news on local stations because they either don’t receive their transmission or don’t care to watch them.
	* In general, 43% said that they trust the news on the Intifada by local stations. 15% said they trust it sometimes, and 5% said they don’t trust it.
	* The percentage of trust increases among those who view the news by these stations, where 68% said that they trust these stations (higher than the Palestinian Official TV and Radio and close to Al-Jazeera).
	* In addition, 27% said they trust them sometimes, and 8% said that they don’t trust them.
	* It must be noted that viewer-ship of these stations is much higher in the West Bank than Gaza, as many don’t transmit to Gaza. It is also important to note that no private stations are licensed to operate in Gaza.
6. **MBC (Satellite station, variety of programs)**
	* 36% of the respondents said that they are unable to evaluate the station as they don’t get the transmission or don’t care to watch it.
	* Another 36% said that they trust its news about the Intifada. 20% said that they trust it sometimes, and 7% said that they don’t trust it.
	* Among those who watch MBC, 58% said that they trust its news. In addition, 34% said that they trust it sometimes, and 11% said that they don’t trust it.
	* MBC enjoys a wider viewer-ship in Gaza than in the West Bank.
7. **Jordan TV (regular and satellite station – variety of programs):**
	* About 40% of the respondents don’t watch the news on Jordan TV either because they don’t get the transmission or don’t care to watch it.
	* Only 13% said that they trust the news by Jordan TV.  23% said they trust it sometimes, and 24% said that they don’t trust it.
	* Over 50% of the Gaza sample doesn’t watch the station. Distrust is 10% higher in the West Bank than in Gaza.
	* Among those who watch Jordan TV, 19% trust its news, 42% don’t trust it, and 40% trust it sometimes.
8. **Israeli TV (One news broadcast in Arabic)**
	* The Israeli TV station is not trusted in terms of its Intifada coverage among the vast majority of Palestinians.
	* 6% of the respondents said that they trust the station. 52% said that they don’t trust Israeli TV, and 21% said that they trust it sometimes.
	* About 20% of Palestinians surveyed don’t watch Israeli TV.
	* Among those who view the news on Israeli TV, 69% said that they don’t trust it. 26% said that they trust it sometimes, and only 6% said that they trust it.
	* Distrust of the station is higher in the West Bank than in Gaza.
9. **Israeli Radio (an all-day official station with a large number of news programs in Arabic)**
	* Only 5% of the respondents said that they trust the news on Israeli Radio. 53% don’t trust it, and 21% trust it sometimes.
	* About 21% don’t follow the news on this station.
	* Among those who follow Israeli Radio’s coverage of the Intifada, 70% don’t trust it, 26% trust it sometimes, and only 4% trust it.

**Other significant findings:*** A majority (57%) believes that Palestinian security agencies are not doing enough to protect Palestinians from Israeli explosives planted in Palestinian cities.
* A majority (51%) evaluates positively the performance of relevant institutions (e.g., fire brigades, the police) in rescue operations after Israeli bombings of Palestinian areas.
* In general, support for Fateh is 23% and support for Hamas is 19%.
* In Gaza, the popularity of Hamas (19.8%) is for the first time ever a little higher than that of Fateh (18.5%) (The gap is within the margin of error).
* 83% oppose carrying guns and shooting in the air during mass rallies. In contrast, 15% support such actions.
* 60% of the educated oppose providing children with any “military training”; something that takes place in conjunction with a limited number of summer camps. In contrast, 30% of the illiterate oppose such training (while 68% of them support that).

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| **Table (1): Attitudes of Fateh and Hamas supporters** |
| **Issue** | **Hamas** | **Fateh** |
| Positive evaluation of President Arafat | 45% | 77% |
| Support for negotiations | 45% | 60% |
| Opposition to suicide attacks | 13% | 23% |
| Trust in Palestinian Official TV’s Intifada coverage  | 53% | 64% |
| Negative evaluation of PNA’s role during the Intifada | 21% | 5% |
| Support for continuation of Intifada | 80% | 83% |
| Support for “mutual seize fire” as proposed by Mitchell Report | 30% | 31% |
| Opposition t firing from Palestinian residential areas | 80% | 80% |
| Percentage of those who are optimistic | 38% | 41% |
| Negative evaluation of USA’s role during the Intifada | 91% | 93% |
| Negative evaluation of Islamic countries’ role during the Intifada | 37% | 39% |

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| **Table (2): Relationship between educational attainment and attitudes** |
|  | **12 Years or less** | **Over 12 Years** |
| Positive evaluation of President Arafat | 60% | 50% |
| Support for negotiations | 52% | 40% |
| Opposition to suicide attacks | 19% | 15% |
| Trust in Palestinian Official TV’s Intifada coverage  | 60% | 48% |
| Negative evaluation of PNA’s role during the Intifada | 14% | 14% |
| Support for continuation of Intifada | 76% | 89% |
| Support for “mutual seize fire” as proposed by Mitchell Report | 30% | 21% |
| Positive evaluation of government civil services | 42% | 28% |
| Opposition to firing from Palestinian residential areas | 81% | 89% |
| Percentage of those who are optimistic | 40% | 36% |
| Negative evaluation of USA’s role during the Intifada | 92% | 99% |
| Negative evaluation of Islamic countries’ role during the Intifada | 38% | 64% |

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