**Public Opinion Poll # 27**

**Living Conditions**

**National Dialogue and the Referendum**

**Evaluation of Institutions**

**[** [**Highlights**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll27/highlights.html)**][** [**Analysis of Results**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll27/analysis.html) **][** [**Detailed Results**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll27/results.html) **][** [**PDF Format**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll27/poll27.pdf) **]**

**[** [**Sample Distribution**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll27/sample.html) **][** [**In Arabic**](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/arabic/opinionpolls/poll27/) **]**

**Analysis of  Results**

**1. The Referendum: (Yes) to the Referendum**

              77% support President Abbas’s call to hold a referendum if political parties do not come to agreement based on the (Prisoners Declaration); 21% do not support such a call.

              77% will vote (YES) to the (Prisoners’ Declaration), while 14% will vote (NO).

              81% support Abbas’s call to adopt the (Prisoners’ Declaration) as the basis for dialogue and Palestinian future vision.

              74% support the view that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

              83% support that Hamas and Islamic Jihad join the PLO.

              84% support the establishment of the Palestinian state over the 1967 territory of the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza.

              83% support that (resistance) be restricted in the Occupied Territories.

              94% support a commitment to a democratic political system and regular elections.

**2. Political Support: Decline in support for Hamas; Fateh does not gain**

              Willingness to vote for Hamas declined from 50% (5 April 2006) to 37% now, bringing its vote to an equal standing with Fateh (also at 37%).

              General support for Hamas is, however, at 33%, while support for Fateh is at 36%.

              25% consider themselves as independents, over 2% support PFLP, while all other parties score 1% or less each.

**3. Use of Mosques as Political Platforms: No to using mosques as political platforms**

              68% oppose the use of mosques as a platform for agenda promotion by the Palestinian Prime Minister, other ministers and political groups; 28% support such action.

              41% believe that mosques are used (always or sometimes) to instigate against some Palestinian leaders, while 51% disagree.

              58% feel that preachers in mosques have a positive role in confronting the current Palestinian crises, while 32% disagree.

**4. The Role of Media:  More doubt than support**

              43% believe that the media (Arab satellite stations and local media) play a positive role in confronting the current crises, while 49% find them to have a negative effect.

              50% feel that some media outlets instigate against some Palestinian leaders, while 41% feel otherwise.

**5. Evaluation of President and Government: support for leaders; but split over government**

              48% evaluate the performance of President M. Abbas as (good) – a 5 points increase from (29 April 2006) poll. In addition, 26% feel it is (medium), while 23% evaluate his performance as (weak).

              57% evaluate the performance of Prime Minster I. Hanneyeh as (good), with no change from previous poll. In addition, 20% feel it is (medium), while 16% evaluate his performance as (weak).

              31% evaluate the overall performance of the current government as (good). In addition, 30% evaluate it as (medium), while 36% evaluate its performance as (weak) – indicating a 9 point increase in negative evaluation from previous poll.

              54% believe that the current government distributes the money that it collects through donations in an (unfair) manner, while 31% disagree.

              21% support the continuation of the present Hamas – led government, while 64% would like to replace it with a national unity government. Support for a technocratic government is at 12%.

              62% feel that the current government is (serious) about its intentions to resolve the current crises, while 32% feel that the government is not serious.

              42% feel that the current government is capable of resolving the current crises, while 48% feel otherwise.

**6. Funding: Split over government’s handling of funding; but no concessions for money by Hamas**

              26% believe that the government is handling the funding crisis in an appropriate manner. In addition 32% believe that its handling of the crises is (medium), while 34% believe that it is (inappropriate).

              While continued polling show a majority support for a two-state solution, the majority of respondents (61%) will not accept that Hamas recognize Israel now in exchange for funding. In contrast, 31% want Hamas to recognize Israel immediately to continue receiving international funding as in the past.

              Only 19% support that money is channeled through the President’s office, and 26% support that an international organization (such as the World Bank) take charge of the disbursement of funding. In contrast, 49% believe that international funding should go directly to the Ministry of Finance without any intermediary.

**7. Responsibility for the Crises: everyone is to blame; some more than others**

              95% say that Israel and the United States have a primary role in the exacerbation of the current crises.

              76% say that the European Union has a primary role in the exacerbation of the current crises.

              59% say that Arab countries have a primary role in the exacerbation of the current crises.

              33% blame Fateh and Hamas for having a primary role in the exacerbation of the current crises. In contrast, 20% say that Hamas has a moderate role in the crises, while 30% say that Fateh has a moderate role in the crises. In addition, 47% feel that Hamas didn’t contribute to the crises, while 37% say that Fateh didn’t contribute to the crises.

**8. Dealing with the Crises: No delivery from anyone!**

              26% feel that the handling of the current crises by the Ministerial cabinet is (good), while 23% feel that it is (medium) and 43% feel that it is (weak).

              23% feel that the handling of the current crises by the Presidential office is (good), while 24% feel that it is (medium) and 46% feel that it is (weak).

              21% feel that the handling of the current crises by the Palestinian Legislative Council is (good), while 21% feel that it is (medium) and 46% feel that it is (weak).

              15% feel that the handling of the current crises by the NGOs is (good), while 26% feel that it is (medium) and 41% feel that it is (weak).

              14% feel that the handling of the current crises by the private sector and banks is (good), while 24% feel that it is (medium) and 46% feel that it is (weak).

              13% feel that the handling of the current crises by the political parties is (good), while 21% feel that it is (medium) and 54% feel that it is (weak).

              11% feel that the handling of the current crises by international institutions is (good), while 17% feel that it is (medium) and 58% feel that it is (weak).

**9. The (Security Force): Conditional Support**

              49% support the decision by the Minister of Interior to establish a new (security force); while opposition is at 39%.

              Palestinians are equally split on the issue of establishing a similar force in the West Bank (at 45% on each side).

              Support for the Minister’s decision to establish such a force declines to 35% if it was not agreed upon by President M. Abbas. Opposition to the establishment of the new force reaches 55% if not supported by President Abbas.

**10. Evaluation of Living Conditions and Prospects for Future: Less security; more economic hardship**

              41% of the respondents feel less secure than they did before the elections of the new PLC and the establishment of the new government. In contrast, 14% feel more secure, and 46% say that nothing has changed.

              Overall, 31% feel secure for themselves and their families, while 24% feel (somewhat secure), and 46% feel (insecure).

              63% say that their household’s income level had declined since the latest PLC elections, while less than 2% say that their income has increased. 35% say that their income level didn’t change.

              Overall, 16% describe the income level of their families as (good or very good), 36% describe it as (medium). In contrast, 48% describe the economic conditions of their families as (bad or very bad).

              64% believe that their families are going through a financial crisis. In addition, 23% believe that their families are going through a financial crisis (to some extent). Only 13% said that they don’t believe that their families are going through such a crisis.

              36% say that their families are not able to afford medical services, 31% say that they are unable to afford educational expenses, and 33% cannot afford transportation and communication expenses.

              11% cannot afford food expenses, and 9.5% cannot afford rent-related expenses.

              17% say that their families have no working breadwinner, while 45% say that they have a breadwinner who works only occasionally. Only 39% have a breadwinner with a stable job.

              Despite all of the previous indicators, 47% continue to say they feel (optimistic) about the future, and 20% say that they are (somewhat optimistic). In contrast, 32% say that they are pessimistic.