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|   | [Opinion Polls](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/opinionpolls/) Poll No. 22Withdrawal from Gaza, President’s Performance, Legislative Elections**[** [**Analysis of Results**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll22/analysis.html) **][** [**Detailed Results**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll22/results.html) **][** [**Sample Distribution**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll22/sample.html) **][** [**PDF Format**](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll22/poll22eng.pdf) **][** [**In Arabic**](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/arabic/opinionpolls/poll22/) **]** **Main Results:** * An increase in the President Performance Index (PPI) from 33% (during April 2005) to 40%[[1]](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll22/analysis.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1%22%20%5Co%20%22).
* There is a noticeable increase of support for President M. Abbas in Gaza Strip, where the PPI  jumped from 33% to 45% (12 points more)
* Wide support of President Abbas' measures concerning the security situation in Gaza, where more than 82% of the respondents supported his effort in putting an end to the misuse of arms, chaos and public insecurity.
* 51% of the respondents believe that President Abbas is capable of implementing his platform in regard to arms’ chaos and insecurity.
* More than 74% of the respondents support a truce with Israel; in Gaza support for a truce reaches 83%.
* 72% expressed their opposition to militant parades, carried out by some factions; the percentage of opposition in Gaza Strip increases to 82%.
* 60% of the respondents still oppose the disarming of the various military groups (brigades). The percentage of opposition to disarming in Gaza is 50%, while the percentage of support is 45%.
* Around 70% expect that there will be an improvement in the functioning of the governmental institutions following the Israeli unilateral disengagement and 61% expect reinforcing the rule of law.
* A Fateh bloc (headed by Marwan Barghouthi) would win 46% of the votes, while Hamas bloc (if headed by Az- Zahhar) would win 23% of the votes. The National Initiative (Al- Mubadara) would gain 7% of the vote (if headed by Mustafa Barghouthi). On the other hand, a bloc comprised of both the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) (headed by Ahmad Sa'adat) would gain 2.5%. The Peoples’ Party - PPP (headed by Bassam Salhi) would gain about 1.4%. What is worth mentioning here is that there will be a different voting pattern emerges with a change in leadership of the blocs.
* Marwan Barghouthi is the most popular candidate inside and outside Fateh, where he gets 55% of the votes when compared with other Fateh candidates. Az- Zahhar is the most popular candidate of Hamas' bloc (46%). Mustafa Barghouthi is the most popular among the candidates of the (Third Way) at 53%.

**Results Analysis:****Part I: The Israeli unilateral disengagement has a significant impact on attitudes, especially in Gaza Strip.** **1. Following the Israeli unilateral disengagement substantial changes and major opinion shifts have been noticed among Gazans. Among the most salient changes and shifts revealed by the poll are as follows:*** PPI in Gaza increased from 33% during April to be 45% at present (12 points more).
* 47% of the respondents in Gaza Strip feel secure after the Israeli pull-out. This is compared to 30% during December 2004.  At the same time, 20% feel secure (to some degree) and 34% do not feel secure (During 2004, 53% of Gaza respondents felt insecure).
* A majority of respondents (40%) in Gaza Strip considers ending the arms anarchy, security chaos and the enforcement of the rule of law as its utmost priority, only to be followed by improving the economic conditions (23%) and a solution to the Palestinian prisoners and detainees’ problem (23%).
* The support of truce among respondents in Gaza Strip is at 83%.
* There is a noticeable, growing trend in Gaza Strip supporting  the disarming of the various military groups. Whereas 31% supported such move in 2004, this poll shows that 46% of the respondents in Gaza Strip are in favor of it.

**2. The Israeli disengagement deepens the perception gap between Gaza and the West Bank:*** 69% of the respondents from the West Bank said that they do not feel secure, while only 34% of the respondents from Gaza Strip share the same feeling (a gap of 35 points).
* 39% of the respondents from the West Bank said that they are pessimistic, whereas only 22% of the respondents from Gaza Strip expressed such an attitude (17 points gap).
* 80% of the respondents in the West Bank considered President Abbas’ performance “good” or “fair”, whereas a positive evaluation of his performance was 89 % in Gaza Strip (9 points gap).
* The support of the truce among West Bank respondents reached 69% whereas 83% of the respondents in Gaza expressed such an attitude (14 points gap).
* The public support to disarm the various military groups reached 29% in the West Bank, while 46% of the respondents in Gaza support this move (17 points gap).
* 37% in the West Bank believe that the Israeli disengagement would improve the performance of the Palestinian institutions, while 65% in Gaza Strip believe in that(28 points gap).
* Only 26% in the West Bank consider that the Israeli withdrawal would lead to improvement in the economic conditions compared to 43% in Gaza Strip (17 points gap).
* 32% of the respondents in the West Bank think that the Israeli withdrawal would lead to reinforcement of the rule of law compared to 54% in Gaza Strip (22 points gap).
* The majority, 61%, expects that the PNA will enforce order and the rule of law. In the West Bank 55% of the respondents expressed this expectation compared to 71%in Gaza Strip.
* Among the respondents, 55% believe that the Israeli withdrawal will improve the economic conditions (46% in the West Bank and 69% in Gaza).
* Also, 56% of the respondents expect the strengthening and consolidation of the relations between the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as the interconnection between the two areas in the wake of the Israeli disengagement (51% in the West Bank and 64% in Gaza).
* Among the West Bank respondents, 43% believe that the withdrawal will put an end to the security disorder/anarchy and the arms’ chaos. In Gaza 58 % of the respondents expressed such a belief.

Yet, the majority of the respondents (64%), in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, believe that the withdrawal from Gaza Strip would reinforce the occupation in the West Bank and would fail to ease the closure.**3.  Ending Arms’ Chaos, the Enforcement of Order and the Rule of Law is the Prime Priority** Concerning the most salient issues, which call for the attention of the PNA in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal, the poll points to three major issues: (a) ending the arms’ chaos, the enforcement of public order and the rule of law; (b) the release of the Palestinian prisoners and detainees and; (c) improving the economic conditions of the Palestinians. * 38% of the respondents (simultaneously in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) considered an end to the arms’ chaos and the enforcement of the rule of law as their most significant priority.
* Releasing Palestinian prisoners is the second priority (27%), while improving the economic conditions is the third priority (23 %).
* The rest of the issues linked to the Israeli unilateral disengagement did not take the same urgency of the three mentioned above. For example, only 6.5% of the respondents considered the easing of the siege on Palestinian cities as their first priority. The issue of renewing the negotiation with Israel considered a priority only by 3.4% of the respondents. Consolidating the relations between Gaza and the West Bank won 2% of the respondents, while the improvement of the performance of the Palestinian institutions gained 1.3 percent.

**Part II: Rising Support for the President Mahmoud Abbas****1**. **There is a growing trend of support for the President’s election platform, that expresses a public longing for security in general, personal security and order, especially in Gaza Strip.*** Respondents, especially in Gaza Strip, expressed a wide support for President Abbas' platform on the issues of bringing security, order and the control of arms.
* In general, 74% of Palestinians supported a truce agreement that prevents attacks against Israel, while the percentage in Gaza Strip reached 83%.
* 82% supported what President Abbas suggested in his speech on 13/9/2005,  after the Israeli withdrawal, about fighting the arms’ chaos, public disorder and the security anarchy. The support for the President's speech in Gaza Strip reached 91%.
* 72% of the respondents opposed armed parades by the Palestinian groups within Palestinian communities. In Gaza Strip the percentage of those who opposed the conduct of such parades reached 82%.
* 93% of the surveyed considered storing ammunition, by some factions in residential areas unacceptable.
* The percentage of those who support the disarmament of militant groups of various militant increased to reach 35% at present, while it was 28% during December 2004. In Gaza the percentage increased from 31% to be 45% (14 points more). Yet, the percentage of those who opposes this move i.e., to disarm the military groups, remains high, especially in the West Bank where 66% adopts such a stance compared to 50% in Gaza Strip. The total percentage (in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) of those who oppose disarmament of military groups remained 60%.

**2.  Progress in the President’s Performance Index (PPI), especially in Gaza*** The PPI shows improvement, in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, from 33% in April 2004 to approximately 40% at present.
* The major progress in the PPI was registered in Gaza Strip where it rose to 45% from 33% during April 2005 (12 points more). However, in the West Bank, the PPI increased a little (three points) to reach 36% from 33% during April 2005.
* President Abbas’ support varied depending on the issue at hand. The highest grades of performance he received were from dealing with issues like: improving the performance of the security apparatuses; support for Palestinian women; democracy promotion; and achieving the Israeli withdrawal. On the other hand, the low grades he received came from dealing with the following issues: achieving public security; fighting corruption; working towards working towards even development and equal distribution of resources between the Palestinian areas.

The table below illustrates the classification of the support for President Abbas, starting from the highest to the lowest percentages of evaluation. Moreover, the table illuminates the differences in the support he received from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In Gaza, President Abbas received high degrees of evaluation on his role in achieving the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and for his role in promoting democracy, support of women as well as for his role in upgrading the performance of Palestinian security apparatuses. The evaluation of the President’s performance in Gaza Strip is strikingly different from the West Bank.

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| **Table 1: President’s Performance According to the Quarterly index (from the highest to the lowest)**  |
|   | **Total** | **West Bank** | **Gaza Strip** |
| 1- Improving the performance of the security apparatuses | 48.3 | 48.0 | 48.9 |
| 2- Promoting the status of Women  | 44.5 | 40.7 | 50.5 |
| 3- Promoting democracy and free speech  | 43.7 | 39.1 | 51.1 |
| 4- Achieving the Israeli withdrawal | 43.1 | 36.6 | 53.5 |
| 5- Improve governmental institutions’ services for the general public (ministries and official departments) | 40.1 | 37.8 | 43.7 |
| 6- Supporting Social Security Programs and Social Development | 39.3 | 36.0 | 44.4 |
| 7- Accomplishing justice in resource allocation between Palestinian geographical areas  | 32.8 | 30.1 | 37.2 |
| 8- Fighting  corruption | 32.5 | 30.0 | 36.3 |
| 9- Achieving public and personal security | 31.9 | 26.3 | 40.9 |
| President performance index (average) | 39.6 | 3.6 | 4.52 |

In another question that measures the present performance of the President, 41% of the respondents consider his performance “good,” 42% “moderate,” and 17% as “weak”. Despite the improvement in the evaluation of President Abbas’ performance, the evaluation of the prime-minister, Ahmad Qurie’, remains the same with no improvement, 25% of the respondents evaluate his performance as “good,” 39% “moderate,” and 36% as “weak.” **Part III:  The Upcoming Parliamentary Elections in January 2006*****1.******The majority intends to participate:**** 67% of the respondents expressed their will to participate in the parliamentary elections, while 28% indicated they will not.
* About 20% of Palestinians state that they are a member of a political party (17% in the West Bank and 24% in Gaza).
* In view of the various scenarios for possible coalitions in the upcoming legislative elections in January 2006, the following results surfaced.

***2. First Scenario: Open competition among all political factions running separately**** A significant percentage (24%) of possible voters are still undecided on how they will vote.
* Fateh bloc will win 46% of the votes in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, whereas the geographic distribution in percentages will be 43% and 47%, respectively.
* Hamas bloc would gain 23% of the votes. Hamas would win 21% of the West Bank votes and 26% in Gaza Strip.
* The percentage of voters for the bloc of the (PFLP) reached 2.3%, whereas its support in the West Bank reached 2.9%, in Gaza Strip it is 1.5%.
* The percentage of voting for the Peoples’ Party is 1.6%, Palestinian Initiative 1.4%, and 1.1% for the (DFLP).

***3. Second Scenario: Blocs led by well-known leaders; a coalition between PFLP and DFLP.**** Compared with the first scenario, there is no change in the popularity of Fateh if led by Marwan Bargouthi (at 46%).
* Hamas gets the same vote if led by Az-Zahar (about 23%).
* The dramatic change is in the vote for Al-Mubadara as led by Mustafa Bargouthi, where its popularity goes from 1.4% to 7%.
* A coalition between PFLP and DFLP does not lead to higher votes (they get about 2.5%).

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| **Table 2: Second scenario**  |
|   | **Total** | **West Bank** | **Gaza Strip** |
|  1- A bloc comprised of Fateh and other independents and headed by **Marwan Barghouthi** | 46.3 | 49.9 | 41.5 |
| 2- A bloc comprised of Hamas and other independents and headed by **Mahmoud Az- Zahhar**  | 23.1 | 21.9 | 24.9 |
| 3- A bloc comprised of the National Initiative and other independents and headed **by Mustafa Barghouthi** | 6.8 | 7.5 | 5.9 |
| 4- A bloc comprised of the Popular Front and the Democratic Front and headed by **Ahmad Sa'adat** | 2.5 | 3.4 | 1.4 |
| 5- A bloc comprised of the Peoples’ Party and other workers federations and headed by **Bassam Salhi** | 1.4 | 1.9 | 0.8 |
| 6- I will participate but I did not decide yet for which bloc I will vote | 15.1 | 13.3 | 17.5 |
| 7- I will participate but I will not vote for any of the above blocs and I am still waiting for the  formation of new blocs  | 4.6 | 2.1 | 8.0 |

***4.***4.***Third scenario: changing Fateh leadership: Ahmad Qurie’ instead of Marwan Barghouthi; Palestinian Initiative and independents: Hanan Ashrawi instead of Mustafa Barghouthi.**** Fateh’s popularity goes down to 36% if led by Ahmad Qurie’.
* Hamas’s popularity increases to 26%.
* A coalition of Al-Mubadara and independents led by H. Ashrawi receives 5%.

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| **Table 3: Third Scenario**  |
|   | **Total** | **West Bank** | **Gaza Strip** |
|  1- A bloc comprised of Fateh and other independents and headed by **Ahmad Qurie’** | 36.1 | 39.7 | 31.4 |
| 2- A bloc comprised of Hamas and other independents and headed by **Mahmoud Az- Zahhar**  | 26.4 | 25.9 | 27.1 |
| 3- A bloc comprised of the Palestinian Initiative and other independents and headed by **Hanan Ashrawi** | 5.0 | 5.8 | 4.0 |
| 4- A bloc comprised of the Popular Front and the Democratic Front and headed by **Ahmad Sa'adat** | 3.0 | 3.4 | 2.3 |
| 5- A bloc comprised of the Peoples’ Party and other workers federations and headed by **Bassam Salhi** | 1.6 | 2.1 | 0.9 |
| 6- I will participate but I did not decide yet  for which bloc I would vote | 19.8 | 18.1 | 22.1 |
| 7- I will participate but I will not vote for any of the above blocs and I am still waiting for the  formation of new blocs  | 8.1 | 5.0 | 12.2 |

**5.    *Fourth scenario: A bloc comprised******of the PLFP and DFLP and the Peoples’ Party (PPP); Fateh led by Salam Fayyad and Hamas led by Ismael Haneyya.**** Fateh gets about 34% as led by S. Fayyad.
* Hamas keeps the same support at 25%.
* Al-Mubadara led by Mustafa Bargouthi gets 8.2%.
* A bloc of (PFLP, DFLP and PPP) gets 4.1%.
* Increase in the percentage of the undecided to 28%.

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| **Table 4: Fourth Scenario**  |
|   | **Total** | **West Bank** | **Gaza Strip** |
| 1- A bloc comprised of Fateh and other independents and headed by **Salam Fayyad** | **34.0** | **35.7** | **31.6** |
| 2- A bloc comprised of Hamas and other independents and headed by **Ismael Haneyya**  | **25.0** | **23.0** | **27.8** |
| 3- A bloc comprised of the Palestinian Initiative and other independents and headed by **Mustafa Barghouthi**  | **8.2** | **8.9** | **7.1** |
| 4- A bloc comprised of PFLP, DFLP and the Peoples’ Party, and other independents and headed by **Ahmad Sa'adat** | **4.1** | **6.0** | **1.7** |
| 5- I will participate but I did not decide for which bloc I would vote | **20.6** | **20.9** | **20.1** |
| 6- I will participate but I will not vote for any of the above blocs and I am still waiting for the formation of new blocs | **8.1** | **5.5** | **11.7** |

***6. Fifth scenario: Three coalitions only: Fateh, Hamas, and the “Third Way”; no leaders are mentioned.**** Fateh gets 47%.
* Hamas keeps its 25%.
* The “third way” gets less than 7%.

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| **Table 5: Fifth Scenario** |
|   | **Total** | **West Bank** | **Gaza Strip** |
| 1- A bloc comprised of PFLP, DFLP, Peoples’ Party, Al-Mubadara, Fida, Popular Struggle Front and Independents | **6.7** | **8.8** | **3.9** |
| 2- A bloc comprised of Hamas and its allies  | **24.7** | **23.5** | **26.3** |
| 3- A bloc comprised of Fateh and its allies | **46.8** | **48.9** | **44.0** |
| 4- I will participate but I did not decide yet for which of those blocs I will vote | **17.5** | **15.6** | **20.1** |
| 5- I will participate but I will not vote for any of the above blocs and I am still waiting for the formation of new blocs | **4.2** | **3.1** | **5.7** |

 **7. *Sixth scenario: open competition between leaders from various political groups**** **Marwan Barghouthi is the most popular candidate, Az- Zahhar comes second and Mustafa Bargouthi third**

Out of ten political figures, Marwan Barghouthi gained 42.2% of the vote, Mahmoud Az- Zahhar 17.7%, and Mustafa Barghouthi 10.7%. Concerning the voting for the remaining political figures, it was as follows: Ismael Haneyya 9%, Ahmad Qurie' 8%, Hanan Ashrawi 5.1%, Salam Fayyad 3.8%, Ahmad Sa'adat 2.1%, Bassam Salhi 0.9%, and Qais Abu Laila 0.6%.**8. Competition among Fateh leaders****Note: these results emerge in case of competition within the same group.  They do not necessarily represent the popularity of the candidate in the general elections, but only the competition inside the bloc itself.*** Marwan Barghouthi gained 55% of the votes to lead Fateh block while Mohammed Dahlan occupied the second position where he gained 14.7% (most of his votes came from Gaza Strip where he got 29% compared to 3.5% in the West Bank). Saeb Erikat came a close third where he gained 13.7%.
* Among the remaining candidates of Fateh, Ahmad Qurie' won the fourth position where he gained 6.4% of the votes then Salam Fayyad who gained 5.5%, while Nabil Amr gained 3.2% and 1% for each of Dalal Salama and Jameela Saydam.

**9.Competition among Hamas leaders.*** The results show thatAz- Zahhar is the most popular candidate among Hamas candidates where he gained 40% of the votes. He gained more support, to lead Hamas' bloc, in the West Bank (45%) than in Gaza Strip (34%).
* In general, Ismaeil Haneyya occupied the second position among the candidates of Hamas where he gained 32%, though he occupied the first position in Gaza Strip where he gained 43%, compared to 34% for Az- Zahhar.
* Hasan Yousef occupied the third position where he gained 10% where his support was nearly the same in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
* Hamed Bitawi came in fourth position and he gained a percentage of 7.2%, but his support was limited to the West Bank, especially in the northern governorates (12.9% in the West Bank compared to 0.3% in Gaza Strip).
* Nizar Rayyan rated fifth (5.2%), then Mohammed Ghazal (2.8%), only to be followed by Saeed Syam with (1.5%), while Jamal Tawil gained only (0.7%).

**10. Competition among (Third Way) leaders*** Among eight candidates for the (third way), Mustafa Barghouthi was the most popular candidate where he gained 53% of the vote. He gained 52% in the West Bank and 54% in Gaza Strip.
* Hanan Ashrawi came second at 16%.
* Yaser Abed Rabo came third at 13%.
* Ahmad Sa'adat came fourth at 11% of the votes.
* Basam Salhi gained 3.6% and came in fifth place followed by Qais Abu Laila 1.3%, Sameer Gousha 1.2% and Zaheera Kamal 0.5%.

**11. For Fateh the best result is achieved when Fateh is mentioned without any specific leader or if led  by Marwan Bargouthi.****12.** **The results for Hamas are very much the same under any circumstances. Their support might change significantly depending on how the (undecided) vote and on how other coalitions carry out their campaigns. Of course, this is also true for other blocs.****13. The best results for the “Third Way” are achieved through running as two different blocs: Al-Mubadara and Independents led by Mustafa Bargouthi (8.2%), and all other groups combined together will win(4.1%):**[[1]](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll22/analysis.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftnref1%22%20%5Co%20%22)  President Performance Index (PPI) is a quarterly evaluation index that evaluates the implementation of the President’s electoral platform since he was elected in January 2004 by applying a composite of nine different indicators which we shall list later. The PPI does not necessarily represent an evaluation of the President's current performance. The evaluation of the President is illustrated later.     [Top of this page](http://home.birzeit.edu/cds/opinionpolls/poll22/analysis.html#top)    |    [DSP Home](http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/)  |   |
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