**Analysis of Results**

**1.   Living Conditions**

***Unprecedented deterioration in living conditions; willingness to immigrate soars***

* 71% say that their living conditions have deteriorated since the January 2006 PLC elections; the percentage in Gaza is as high as 78%.
* 26.4% say their income did not change, and only 2.1% say their family’s income improved.
* 51.9% describe their economic conditions as bad or very bad, compared with approximately 40% during the last few years.
* 61.4% of Gaza respondents describe their economic conditions as bad or very bad, compared with 46.8% in the West Bank.
* 50.2% don’t feel secure for themselves, their family and property, and 26.2% feel secure to some extent.
* The most shocking result is related to willingness to immigrate. Overall, 32.4% of respondents say they are willing to immigrate compared with approximately 19% during the last few years (a 13-point increase). The results also show that 44% of young Palestinians are willing to immigrate if given the opportunity.
* Overall, 62.3% feel that Palestinian society is not heading in the right direction; 30.6% believe it is headed in the right direction.
* Nevertheless, 44.4% are optimistic, 22.7% are somewhat optimistic, and 32.2% are pessimistic.

**2.   Survival Strategies**

***Savings are drying up, and the upcoming three months will be critical>***

In dealing with the ongoing economic hardship, respondents utilized the following mechanisms

* 39% of the families asked for assistance (financial or in kind); out of those about 50% received such assistance.
* 85.8% reduced expenditures, 67.6% spent savings, 59.4% resorted to borrowing, and 51.7% sold the wife’s dowry.
* Overall, 35% say their families will not be able to secure basic needs if the current situation continues during the coming three months; 46.8% will be able to secure basic needs with difficulty, and only 16.1% will be able to secure basic needs without a problem.
* 43.9% of Gaza respondents say their families will not be able to secure basic needs if the current situation continues during the coming three months.

**3.   Seeking Assistance**

***No where to go soon!***

* One-fifth (20%) of respondents sought assistance from NGOs and charitable organizations, while 17.7% sought assistance from other family/clan members. 13.5% went to PNA institutions and 13.2% sought help from UNRWA.
* The differences between West Bank and Gaza are significant, as 17.6% of West Bank respondents resorted to PNA institutions, compared with 7.5% in Gaza.
* Just over one-fifth (20.9%) of West Bank respondents sought help from their family/clan, while 13.3% did the same in Gaza.
* UNRWA played a more important role in Gaza (15.9%) than in the West Bank (11.3%).
* NGOs also played a more important role in Gaza (22%) than in the West Bank (18.6%).
* Slightly less than one-third of Gaza respondents (29.6%) sought assistance from more than one source, compared with 17.1% of West Bank respondents.

**4.   Evaluation of Local Institutions**

***Political groups, PLC and government are viewed negatively; UNRWA positively.***

* Concerning the evaluation of the performance of the institutions that work within the West Bank and Gaza, political parties, the Government (Cabinet) and the PLC receive the most negative evaluations, while UNRWA and NGOs/charitable organizations receive the most favorable evaluation. The following are the percentages of respondents who describe the role of the following institutions as poor.

-          58.4%              Political Parties

-          55.4%              Government (Cabinet)

-          55.0%              PLC

-          48.9%              Local and Municipal Councils

-          48.4%              President’s Office

-          44.2%              Private Sector Institutions

-          40.7%              International Organizations Working in Palestine

-          36.9%              NGOs

-          25.1%              UNRWA

**5.   Evaluation of Political Actors**

***Hamas is more criticized than Fateh; the US & Israel are blamed the most***

* 43.5% view negatively the role of Hamas in dealing with the current situation in Palestine, while 40.2% view negatively the role of Fateh.
* In terms of outside actors, respondents give all actors more negative than positive evaluation. Iran and Syria score the highest positive evaluation, compared with Israel and the U.S. who receive the lowest positive evaluation. The following are the percentages of respondents who describe the role of the following actors as negative.

-     94.8%              Israel

-     94.4%              USA

-     68.3%              U.N.

-     63.2%              E.U.

-     65.3%              Jordan

-     55.7%              Egypt

-     54.9%              Russia

-     46.6%              Saudi Arabia

-     43.5%              Hamas

-     40.2%              Fateh

-     40.2%              Syria

-     32.0%              Iran

**6.   Evaluation of Leaders**

***Decline in the popularity of President Abbas and Prime Minster Hanneya***

* The popularity of President Mahmoud Abbas declined during the last six months, where 33.8% view his performance as good, 34.2% as average, and 32.0% as weak. This is compared with approximately 54% viewing his performance as good in April 2006 – a 20-point decline.
* There is also a significant decline in the popularity of Prime Minster Ismael Hanneya, where 38.5% view his performance as good, 31.8% as average, and 29.8% as weak. This is compared with approximately 64% viewing his performance as good in April 2006 – a 25-point decline.
* The data show a decline in the gap between Hanneya and Abbas (from 10 points in favor of Hanneya in April 2006 to five points in September 2006).

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| **Evaluation of the Performance of Abbas & Hanneya (2006)** |
|  | **April** | **June** | **September** |
|  | **Good** | **Average** | **Total** | **Good** | **Average** | **Total** | **Good**  | **Average** | **Total** |
| **Abbas** | **54%** | **27%** | **81%** | **48%** | **26%** | **74%** | **34%** | **34%** | **68%** |
| **Hanneya** | **64%** | **19%** | **83%** | **57%** | **27%** | **84%** | **39%** | **32%** | **71%** |

**7.   The Performance of Hamas**

***Majority view Hamas’s implementation of its program negatively; 57% are unable to reiterate the Hamas election agenda***

* The survey shows a significant decline in the expectations from the Hamas win in the PLC elections, where 26.0% expect the election of Hamas to the PLC will improve opportunities for independence, compared with approximately 48% in April 2006 – a 22-point decline.
* Just over one-quarter (26.4%) expect the Hamas win will lead to improving internal living conditions, compared with approximately 56% in April 2006 – a 30-point decline.
* Slightly less than one-third (31.6%) expect the Hamas win will reinforce democracy, compared with approximately 50% in April 2006 – an 18-point decline.
* When asked to explain the Hamas PLC election program, 56.7% said they did not know what the Hamas program was, while 21.0% said they knew the program to some extent, and 22.3% said they knew enough to be able to explain it.
* 60.4% evaluate the implementation of the Hamas program by the new government as weak, while 26.3% evaluate it as average, and only 13.3% evaluate the implementation as good.

**8. The Strike**

***Majority: support for the strikers; negative evaluation of government’s handling of the strike***

* 56.6% support the strike organized by public service employees and teachers, while 41.5% oppose it.
* 53.7% evaluate the performance of the government in dealing with the strike as negative, 27.0% evaluate its performance as average, and 19.3% see the government’s performance as positive.

**9. The Proposed Unity Government**

***Better chances for success on internal issues; ministers must come from outside the PLC***

* Two-thirds of the respondents believe that a national unity government has a better chance of succeeding than the current government; only 14% disagree.
* A majority of 55.3% believe that new ministers should be selected from outside the PLC, while 32.5% believe they should come from within the PLC.
* 66.6% believe a national unity government will not be able to put an end to the building of settlements and the Wall.
* 56.8% believe a national unity government will not be able to end the occupation and achieve independence, whereas 19.0% believe it will, and 24.2% believe it will to some extent. The percentage of those who believe such a government will not be able to bring about independence is as high as 64.8% among West Bank respondents, compared with 41.7% among Gaza respondents.
* The majority of respondents (59.3%) are optimistic the new unity government will bring international assistance, while 27.3% believe a unity government will be capable of doing that to some extent, and 13.5% do not believe it will be capable of securing funding.
* 51.5% believe the proposed unity government will be able to improve international diplomatic relations; 46.8% believe it will be able to improve government services; 40.9% believe it will be able to improve public and personal freedoms; 37.1% believe it will be able to improve economic conditions; 38.0% believe it will be able to improve the situation of women; and 37.2% believe it will be able to combat internal security chaos/end the current state of lawlessness.

**10. Possible Scenarios for Moving Forward**

***Majority: No to status quo; yes to a unity government led by Hamas; yes to a new PLC election; yes to an independent prime minister***

* 62.8% oppose the continuation of the status quo (i.e., keeping the PLC and the Cabinet as they are). Only 33.7% support (fully or to some extent) such a proposition.
* At the same time, 60.0% support (fully or to some extent) the dissolution of the PLC and the conduct of a new PLC election while 36.0% oppose that strategy.
* 65.8% support (fully or to some extent) dissolving the current government and forming a unity government led by Hamas; 29.9% oppose that option.
* 61.9% support (fully or to some extent) the President appointing an independent prime minister with ministers from all political factions; 32.5% oppose that.
* 54.7% support (fully or to some extent) the President appointing a ministerial cabinet that is fully independent from political parties; 39.9% oppose such a strategy.
* 46.3% support (fully or to some extent) going back to the situation before the January 2006 PLC elections, while 50.9% oppose that.
* 41.2% support (fully or to some extent) keeping the current PLC and bringing back the previous government (that which existed before the January PLC elections); 55.1% oppose that.
* 39.9% support (fully or to some extent) the President appointing a government as he sees fit; 56.5% oppose that.

**11. Palestinian Elections**

***Decline in the popularity of Hamas; for Fateh there is no change***

* A majority of respondents support the conduct of a new presidential election (57.3%) and a new PLC election (57.6%). Approximately 38.5% oppose such an idea.
* If elections took place today, Fateh would receive 34.9% of the vote (exceeding Hamas for the first time since the January elections); Hamas would receive 30.5%.
* The political landscape had drastically changed during the last six months. The table below shows the popularity of Hamas after the January elections soared to 50% (April 2006), but then started its decline to reach 37% (June 2006), and now to 31%.
* Hamas’s losses are not translated to wins by Fateh; the votes lost by Hamas are not going to any of the political groups listed in the poll. Fateh’s popularity remains at approximately 35%.
* **These percentages don’t take into account those who say they will not participate in any upcoming elections (17%); if taken into account, Fateh will receive 42% of the vote (the same percentage it received in the January elections), and Hamas will receive 37% of the vote (7 points less than January).**

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| **Hamas’s popularity declining with no change in Fateh’s popularity (2006)** |
|  | **April** | **June** | **September** |
| **Hamas** | **50%** | **37%** | **31%** |
| **Fateh** | **35%** | **37%** | **35%** |

* In Gaza, Fateh would receive 43.0% of the vote, compared with 30.6% in the West Bank.
* Hamas would receive the same percentage of support in both the West Bank and Gaza (30.7% and 30.1% respectively).
* All other political groups combined would receive 6.9% of the vote.
* These data mean that the results of any elections will be decided by those who are undecided or say they will not participate (27.7% of respondents). Therefore, the results of this poll do not provide any decisive numbers on the actual results of the elections as the gap between the political parties is not large enough.

**12. Peace Process and Negotiations**

***Palestinians: Yes to negotiation;, no to an immediate recognition of Israel by Hamas***

* 67.0% support an immediate resumption of negotiations with Israel, while 29.7% are in opposition.
* In addition, 64.5% support the PNA (led by Hamas) entering into immediate negotiations with Israel to reach a final status agreement.
* 57.8% support a two-state solution as a final settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; 39.0% oppose such a solution.
* 52.5% support the idea that Hamas must recognize international resolutions regarding Palestine; 41.0% are in opposition.
* 52.0% support the idea that Hamas must recognize the agreements signed between the PLO and Israel; 40.8% oppose such a solution.
* The majority (62.3%) opposes the idea that Hamas must recognize Israel at this point of time; one-third (33.3%) support Hamas’s immediate recognition of Israel.

**13. Hezbollah & Hamas**

***Vast majority believes Hezbollah is doing better than Hamas***

* 68.8% of respondents believe the performance of Hezbollah is better than that of Hamas, while 24.4% believe their performance is comparable, and only 3.8% believe the performance of Hamas is better than that of Hezbollah.
* 18.6% of respondents participated in public activities in support of Lebanon and against the war. In Gaza, the percentage increased to 25.1%, while in the West Bank it was 15.1%. Approximately 28% of the most educated (diploma and above) say they participated in activities in support of Lebanon.